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The Committee for Economic Development
is an independent research and policy organi-
zation of some 250 business leaders and educa-
tors. CED is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and non-
political. Its purpose is to propose policies that
bring about steady economic growth at high
employment and reasonably stable prices, in-
creased productivity and living standards,
greater and more equal opportunity for every
citizen, and an improved quality of life for all.
All CED policy recommendations must have
the approval of trustees on the Research and
Policy Committee. This committee is directed
under the bylaws, which emphasize that “all
research is to be thoroughly objective in char-
acter, and the approach in each instance is to
be from the standpoint of the general welfare
and not from that of any special political or
economic group.” The committee is aided by a
Research Advisory Board of leading social sci-
entists and by a small permanent professional
staff.
The Research and Policy Committee does
not attempt to pass judgment on any pending
specific legislative proposals; its purpose is to
urge careful consideration of the objectives set
forth in this statement and of the best means of
accomplishing those objectives.
Each statement is preceded by extensive dis-
cussions, meetings, and exchange of memo-
randa. The research is undertaken by a sub-
committee, assisted by advisors chosen for their
competence in the field under study.
The full Research and Policy Committee
participates in the drafting of recommenda-
tions. Likewise, the trustees on the drafting
subcommittee vote to approve or disapprove a
policy statement, and they share with the
Research and Policy Committee the privilege
of submitting individual comments for publica-
tion.
Except for the members of the Research and
Policy Committee and the responsible subcommit-
tee, the recommendations presented herein are not
necessarily endorsed by other trustees or by the
advisors, contributors, staff members, or others
associated with CED.
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Effective political campaigns have always
been fueled by money as well as ideas. But in
recent years, the cost of running for Congress or
the Presidency has soared to record heights. For
many candidates, raising money is no longer
one important issue; it is the only issue.
For incumbents and challengers, the system
has evolved (or devolved) into an eternal quest
for campaign funds. Good people with limited
resources are discouraged from seeking office.
Broad popular participation in campaigns has
been muscled aside by deep-pocket organiza-
tions and individuals. Vast sums of unregu-
lated “soft” money have poured into political
parties and issue-oriented advertising. Most
important, disparities in campaign resources
have reduced electoral competition. Over half
the House races in 1998 were so one-sided as to
not be truly competitive.
In this policy statement, the Trustees of CED
make a strong case for sweeping reforms that
will restore trust and balance to the campaign
finance system, while protecting the first amend-
ment rights of candidates and contributors. We
call for a broad package of changes in federal
election financing rules that we believe will im-
prove competition, increase citizen participa-
tion, and staunch the flow of unregulated
money.
Campaign finance reform does not rank high
on most Americans’ lists of national problems.
We think it should.  We urge the American
people — especially our colleagues in business
— to take a more active role in supporting
changes that will restore public confidence in
the electoral process and encourage more
Americans to actively participate in federal elec-
tions.
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Purpose of This Statement
1I.
Introduction and
Executive Summary
The American public believes that our cam-
paign finance system is broken. The vast major-
ity of citizens feel that money threatens the
basic fairness and integrity of our political sys-
tem.1 Two out of three Americans think that
money has an “excessive influence” on elec-
tions and government policy.2 Substantial ma-
jorities in poll after poll agree that “Congress is
largely owned by the special interest groups,”
or that special interests have “too much influ-
ence over elected officials.”3 Fully two-thirds of
the public think that “their own representative
in Congress would listen to the views of outsid-
ers who made large political contributions be-
fore a constituent’s views.”4
These findings, typical of the results of pub-
lic opinion surveys conducted in recent years,
indicate a deep cynicism regarding the role of
money in politics. Many citizens have lost faith
in the political process and doubt their ability
as individuals to make a difference in our
nation’s political life. Americans see rising cam-
paign expenditures, highly publicized scandals
and allegations regarding fundraising practices,
and a dramatic growth in unregulated money
flowing into elections. It is therefore not sur-
prising that voter cynicism and disillusionment
have increased along with campaign spending.
One symptom of the public’s growing alien-
ation is our declining level of voter turnout,
which dropped to 36 percent in 1998, the low-
est turnout in a midterm election since 1942.5
In 1996, only 49 percent of voters went to the
polls, a 70-year low for a presidential election.6
Another symptom is the distressingly low level
of trust in government, notwithstanding some
improvement in recent years.7
CED is deeply concerned about these nega-
tive public attitudes toward government and
the role of money in the political process. These
attitudes highlight the importance the public
places on campaign funding in forming its opin-
ions of government. They also indicate the
detrimental effects of the changes that have
taken place in the political finance system since
the adoption of the 1974 Federal Election Cam-
paign Act (FECA), which was passed in the
wake of the Watergate scandal to resolve the
problems of our campaign finance system.
As business leaders, we are also concerned
about the effects of the campaign finance sys-
tem on the economy and business. Americans
identify “special interests” principally with cor-
porations. A vibrant economy and well func-
tioning business system will not remain viable
in an environment of real or perceived corrup-
tion, which will corrode confidence in govern-
ment and business. If public policy decisions
are made—or appear to be made—on the
basis of political contributions, not only will
policy be suspect, but its uncertain and arbi-
trary character will make business planning
less effective and the economy less productive.
In addition, the pressures on businesses to con-
tribute to campaigns because their competi-
tors do so will increase. We wish to compete in
the marketplace, not in the political arena.
Free and fair elections are an essential com-
ponent of democratic government—and they
cannot be conducted without money. Candi-
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dates must have a reasonable opportunity to
obtain the resources needed to wage effective
campaigns. Well-funded campaigns strengthen
electoral competition and can increase the in-
formation available to voters, which in turn
can invigorate citizen participation in elections
and government. A well-designed campaign fi-
nance system would encourage citizens to ful-
fill their public responsibility by participating
actively in the process as candidates, donors,
and voters.
Our present system often does not provide
these benefits. Instead, the insatiable demand
for election money raises concerns about the
quality of political representation and the in-
tegrity of the political process. As campaign
expenditures increase and larger sums are spent
to win elective office, money becomes a barrier
to entry into the political arena and provides
undue advantage to those with access to large
amounts of it. Because our system of private
congressional campaign funding is based on
the voluntary participation of individual citi-
zens and organized groups, questions also arise
about the interests that accompany campaign
contributions. The solicitation and donation
of private contributions can promote healthy
interactions between politicians and their sup-
porters. This process can inform government
decision making and improve the responsive-
ness of the political system to constituents’ in-
terests. But it can also lead to improper rela-
tionships between donors and policymakers or
produce perceptions of influence that fuel pub-
lic disaffection.
We therefore believe we must reconsider
the laws and regulations governing our system
of political finance. We have conducted a dis-
passionate review of our current system and
the major patterns of financial activity in re-
cent elections. We have analyzed the many criti-
cisms advanced against the current system and
identified the major issues and objectives that
we believe should serve as guidelines in the
design of regulation. This report presents our
analysis and conclusions and sets forth our
recommendations for reform.
FINDINGS
We have identified four fundamental prob-
lems in the current system that challenge basic
principles of democratic government:
(1) Money and fundraising have become
too important and demanding in our political
life. Rising campaign costs and the pressures
on candidates to outspend their opponents
have driven the campaign expenditures of the
average House candidate over $500,000, while
the average Senate contender spends nearly
$3.8 million.8 Candidates must spend enormous
time and energy soliciting contributions, which
detracts from the quality of representation they
provide their constituents and the amount of
time they have available to discuss their views
with them.
(2) The high cost of campaigns and the
burdens of fundraising have reduced competi-
tion and the pool of qualified candidates in
federal elections. The financial demands of a
typical federal race are pricing potential candi-
dates out of the competition and discouraging
some well qualified candidates from seeking
office. Personal wealth is becoming a more
important requirement for effective candidacy.
Those who do decide to run against incum-
bents very often find it difficult to raise the
sums needed to wage a viable campaign and, in
almost every case, are outspent by substantial
margins. Challengers, especially in House races,
are increasingly underfunded, and the num-
ber of competitive races has declined. When
competition is weak, voter choice is limited.
Too many contests for our nation’s highest
offices fail to generate public participation or
inspire citizens to vote.
(3) The role of the small donor has de-
clined. Incumbents and challengers alike have
sought to meet the financial demands of cam-
paigns by concentrating on large gifts from
their most generous supporters. In 1998, 61
percent of the money received by congressional
candidates from individual donors was raised
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in contributions of $500 or more—a much
higher proportion than the 38 percent only 14
years earlier. Incumbents have also emphasized
political action committee (PAC) contributions,
since these committees, especially those spon-
sored by corporate and trade associations, are
primarily concerned with gaining access to
legislators and rely on their contributions to
obtain this access. The growth of PACs has led
many voters to conclude that these committees
and other organized interests have so much
political influence that small contributions by
individuals have little effect. Their disaffection
has reduced participation in elections and weak-
ened public faith in the legitimacy of election
results.
(4) Unregulated funds raised and spent in
federal elections have increased dramatically.
We are especially troubled by the growth of
party “soft money” financing and candidate-
specific “issue” advertising. Instead of encour-
aging financial activity within the rules of FECA,
the current system encourages financial activi-
ties beyond the law’s authority. Parties and
organized groups, including committees spon-
sored by corporations and labor unions, have
strong incentives to solicit and spend money in
unregulated ways and to engage in transac-
tions hidden from public disclosure.
In the 1996 election cycle, national party
committees raised and spent over $250 million
in “soft money” exempt from federal contribu-
tion limits. In 1998 they raised $201 million, a
record for a midterm election; the Republi-
cans raised 112 percent more than in 1994,
and the Democrats 89 percent. The parties
used this money for such activities as party-
building, candidate-specific issue ads, and voter
registration and turnout drives. Much of this
money was raised through contributions of
$100,000 or more from individuals, PACs, cor-
porations, and labor unions, often with the
overt assistance of federal officeholders. In ad-
dition, millions of dollars were spent on candi-
date-specific issue ads by organized groups that
did not report their financial activity, since
these ads are not subject to FECA. These un-
limited funding devices give a relatively small
group of donors great influence in the elec-
toral process. They facilitate relationships be-
tween monied interests and candidates that
increase the possibility of corruption and un-
dermine the accountability and transparency
that safeguard against it. And they threaten to
place candidates and their campaign issues in
the shadow of intervening interest groups,
whose unregulated expenditures drive their
own political agendas.
THE COMPLEXITY OF REFORM
These four problems are not easily solved.
Regulating political behavior is always difficult,
but especially so when financing innovations
are changing the landscape. No one or two
changes will achieve the diverse, and some-
times competing, objectives of a well-function-
ing system. We need a comprehensive reform
program that honestly acknowledges compet-
ing values and provides the necessary trade-
offs between them.
Successful reform must balance the need
for regulation with the protection of First
Amendment liberties. It must permit the fund-
ing needed for full and robust political debate
and competition while limiting the undue in-
fluence of money. Reform must also pay due
regard to the effects of specific changes on
political parties and particular types of candi-
dates or sources of funding.
We have considered a full range of reform
proposals, from deregulation and simple dis-
closure to the leading proposals for public fi-
nancing. We have carefully weighed the poten-
tial effects and consequences of each. Our
deliberations have led us to recommend the
following program of major changes. When
taken as a whole, we believe this program can
provide the balance needed to strengthen our
democracy.*  **
*See memorandum by HARRY L. FREEMAN (page 43).
**See memorandum by NED REGAN (page 43).
4The four sets of recommendations that are
summarized below are described in more de-
tail in Chapter IV of this report.
Recommendation #1:
ELIMINATE SOFT MONEY
As a general principle, funds used to pro-
mote political candidacies should be subject to
the requirements and restrictions of federal
campaign finance law. Soft money is the most
egregious example of campaign financing that
violates this principle. No reform is more urgently
needed than a ban on national party “soft money”
financing. Some business leaders have already
moved in this direction by refusing to make
soft money contributions. We urge other mem-
bers of the business community, labor unions,
and individual citizens to follow this lead and
voluntarily work to reduce the supply of soft
money funds.
CED also recommends that Congress pro-
hibit national party committees and federal
officeholders and candidates from raising or
spending soft money. As a complementary mea-
sure, we urge state legislatures to pass any leg-
islation needed to ensure that state party com-
mittees cannot finance their activities from
unlimited or undisclosed sources of funding.
This change will reduce the role of large indi-
vidual contributors in the political process and
prohibit parties from raising contributions from
corporations or labor unions.
Party committees play a valuable role in the
political process. They are important sources
of funding for challengers and for efforts to
improve voter participation. We realize that
eliminating soft money will significantly reduce
the resources available to party organizations.
To partially compensate for this loss, we rec-
ommend a change in the rules limiting indi-
vidual contributions to federal candidates and
political committees. Under current law, indi-
viduals are limited to an annual total of $25,000
for all contributions made to federal candi-
dates, PACs, and party committees. We pro-
pose that Congress establish two separate ag-
gregate limits for individuals. The first would
limit the total amount contributed by an indi-
vidual to federal candidates and PACs to
$25,000 annually. The second, separate ceiling
would limit the total amount contributed by an
individual to national party committees to
$25,000 annually. This change will allow par-
ties to raise more regulated money from indi-
viduals than is permissible under current fed-
eral law.
Recommendation #2:
IMPROVE CANDIDATE ACCESS
TO RESOURCES
Candidates should have the opportunity to
raise the money they need to communicate
effectively with voters and mount competitive
campaigns without having to spend an inordi-
nate amount of time and resources on
fundraising. We therefore recommend that
Congress raise the limit on individual contribu-
tions to federal candidates from $1,000 to
$3,000 per candidate per election and thereaf-
ter adjust this limit for inflation. This increase
will restore the purchasing power of a maxi-
mum individual contribution that has been
lost since FECA was adopted 25 years ago. How-
ever, an individual’s total contributions to fed-
eral candidates and PACs should remain sub-
ject to the annual limit of $25,000 noted above.*
Only a small proportion of donors are able or
willing to contribute at the maximum level,
and this limit will help reduce the political
influence of these wealthy donors.
We believe it is essential to enhance the role
of small individual contributors in campaigns
and to reduce the amount of time candidates
have to spend raising money. Therefore, we
strongly recommend that Congress establish a
voluntary program of public funding for con-
gressional candidates. This program would pro-
vide eligible House and Senate candidates with
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
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*See memorandum by WILLIAM F. HECHT, (page 44).
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two dollars in public money for every dollar
received from an individual donor, up to a
maximum of $400 for each individual contri-
bution of $200.
Candidates who choose to participate in
this program would be required to abide by
spending limits, as described below. Each par-
ticipating candidate would also be required to
limit any personal contribution to his or her
own campaign to $25,000. This reform will
give candidates a strong incentive to solicit
small individual contributions and small con-
tributors an incentive to make them. It will
significantly reduce the emphasis on fundrais-
ing in federal campaigns because, with this
amount of matching funds, candidates will have
an option of receiving a majority of their cam-
paign money from small contributions and the
matching public funds. Indeed, total individual
contributions plus the matching funds would
be sufficient to fully finance congressional cam-
paign spending at current levels. Finally, this
change will increase competition in federal
elections by substantially increasing the re-
sources available to challengers.
Recommendation #3:
REDUCE THE FUNDRAISING “ARMS
RACE” WITH CONGRESSIONAL
SPENDING LIMITS
Improving candidates’ access to resources
will not reduce the demand for campaign funds
or the amount of time candidates spend rais-
ing money if the additional funds simply feed a
funding “arms race.” It is therefore essential
that Congress also enact a system of spending
limits on House and Senate candidates who
accept public funding, as we now do in presi-
dential elections. These limits should be gener-
ous enough to induce candidates to accept pub-
lic financing, but stringent enough to reduce
the growth of campaign spending. Accordingly,
we call for limits (detailed on page 38) higher
than those proposed in recent reform bills pre-
sented to the Congress. The application of
such limits must be flexible enough to ensure
that candidates who agree to restrict spending
are not materially disadvantaged if they face
opponents who do not comply with the limits
or if they are opposed by “independent” ex-
penditures by the opposing party or outside
groups.
We recognize that spending limits will not
necessarily increase electoral competition, es-
pecially if candidates are unable to raise funds
commensurate with those available to their op-
ponents. We therefore recommend that party
committees be allowed to supplement a
candidate’s resources and finance the differ-
ence between the amount he or she raises and
the relevant spending limit. Spending limits
would be adjusted for candidates facing oppo-
nents who have not agreed to limits.†
The benefits of these recommendations can
be realized only if these spending limits and
other requirements are effectively monitored
and enforced. We are concerned that the Fed-
eral Election Commission (FEC), the agency
responsible for overseeing the law, is under-
funded and understaffed. It currently lacks the
resources needed to administer a program of
congressional campaigns with public financing
and expenditure limits. We therefore urge Con-
gress to review the staffing, structure, and cur-
rent funding of the FEC and provide it with the
resources and authority needed to ensure accu-
rate and timely monitoring and compliance with
the law.
Recommendation #4:
REFORM ISSUE ADVOCACY
Greater regulation of candidate-specific
issue advertising is needed to ensure a mean-
ingful regulatory system. The current legal stan-
dard used to define “express advocacy” (the
type of speech subject to regulation under fed-
†This recommendation would allow party committees, in most
instances, to provide greater assistance to federal candidates
than that allowed under current law. We recognize that coordi-
nated spending limits are presently being reviewed by the courts.
In general, we support the principle of expanded party financ-
ing of elections, since it is a means of encouraging more fully
funded and competitive elections.
6eral campaign finance law) is too narrow. We
prefer a broader standard that will make it
harder to by-pass our federal election laws. We
urge Congress to adopt a standard that sets
forth clear criteria for identifying public com-
munications that constitute express advocacy,
to require that such communications be wholly
financed from funds raised under federal con-
tribution limits, and to require that the sources
of funding and amounts spent on such commu-
nications be publicly disclosed. We suggest that
express advocacy include communications that:
(1) refer to, or feature the image or likeness
of, a clearly identified federal candidate; (2)
occur within 30 days of a primary election and
are targeted at the state in which the primary is
occurring, or within 60 days of a general elec-
tion; and (3) would be understood by a reason-
able person to be encouraging others to sup-
port or oppose that candidate.
If such a broader standard for determining
express advocacy is not upheld by the courts,
we believe that, at a minimum, prompt public
disclosure of the financial activity associated
with these communications should be required.
We recommend requirements for full public
disclosure of the sources of funding and
amounts spent on such communication. Such
disclosure will ensure that the public can know
who is attempting to influence its voting deci-
sions and will thus promote informed decision-
making in the electoral process.
Table 1 compares the major features of
CED’s proposed reforms with the current
system:
SOFT MONEY • Allows soft money; allows
national party committees to
raise and spend unlimited
amounts of money received
from individuals, labor unions,
corporations, and other donors.
• Allows federal elected
officials and candidates to
raise soft money for national
party committees.
• Limits individual contributions
to federal candidates to $1,000
per candidate per election.
• Limits the annual aggregate
amount contributed by an individ-
ual to federal candidates, PACs,
and party committees to $25,000.
INDIVIDUAL
CONTRIBUTIONS
PUBLIC
FUNDING
• No provision for public funding
in congressional elections.
EXPENDITURE
LIMITS
• No expenditure limits for
congressional candidates.
PARTY
EXPENDITURES
• Allows party committees to spend
a limited amount in coordination
with federal candidates.
• Communications that do not
expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a federal candidate are
not subject to the provisions of
federal campaign finance law.
There are no public disclosure
requirements or restrictions on
their sources of funding.
• “Express advocacy” is defined
narrowly, requiring the use of
specific words in the text of a
message indicating such advocacy.
ISSUE
ADVOCACY
SUBJECT                    CURRENT SYSTEM
TABLE 1
Comparison of Major Features of CED
Reform Proposal with Current System
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• Eliminate soft money by prohibiting national party committees from soliciting, receiving, spending, directing or
transferring any funds that are not subject to the restrictions of federal law.
• Prohibit federal elected officials and candidates from raising funds for national party committees that are not
subject to federal contribution limits.
• Prohibit federal elected officials and candidates from sponsoring PACs that receive money not subject to federal
contribution limits.
• Encourage state legislatures to adopt legislation or regulations to ensure that state party committees cannot finance
their activities with unlimited or undisclosed funds.
• Limit individual contributions to federal candidates to $3,000 per candidate per election, with adjustment for
inflation.
• Limit the annual aggregate amount contributed by an individual to federal candidates and PACs to $25,000.
• Establish a separate annual aggregate limit of $25,000 for individual contributions to party committees.
• Establish a voluntary program of public matching funds in congressional elections. Eligible candidates would
receive $2 in public funding for every $1 raised from an individual contributor, up to a maximum of $400 for an
individual contribution of $200. To be eligible, candidates must agree to limit personal contributions to their own
campaigns and agree to spending limits.
• Require congressional candidates who accept public funding to abide by spending limits. The ceilings would be set
at $500,000 per election in House races (with $200,000 for a runoff election) and a base of $1 million plus 50 cents
times the voting-age population of a state in Senate races (with an additional 20 percent for a runoff election).
These ceilings will be adjusted for inflation and for candidates facing opponents who have not agreed to limits.
• Allow party committees to spend money in coordination with federal candidates up to the spending limit. That is,
parties can make up any difference between a candidate’s total spending and the amount of the spending ceiling.
• Expand the definition of “express advocacy” communications to include public communications that are broadcast
or distributed within a certain time period prior to an election and meet specific criteria. Communications that
meet these criteria would be considered express advocacy and be subject to full public disclosure and limits on their
sources of funding.
• Should the courts not accept a broader definition of express advocacy, would require full public disclosure of the
amounts spent and sources of funding for issue advocacy communications broadcast or distributed within a certain
time period prior to an election.
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Financing Federal
Elections
Money is essential to political campaigns. It
is the means by which candidates acquire the
goods, services, and skills needed to share their
views with the electorate and mobilize public
support. Without adequate funding, a candi-
date has little chance of becoming known to
the electorate and waging a viable campaign.
Money therefore plays a key role in determin-
ing the choices available to voters and the com-
petitiveness of elections.
In recent decades, the role of money in
election campaigns has become more promi-
nent—and more controversial. The costs of
seeking office have grown, as candidates have
engaged in increasingly sophisticated methods
of campaigning and turned more to broadcast
advertising as their principal means of commu-
nicating with voters. These rising costs require
candidates to spend increasing amounts of their
time and resources fundraising.
CED believes that the increasing financial
requirements of recent elections and the grow-
ing emphasis on fundraising raise serious ques-
tions about the health of our campaign finance
system. Our main concern is that an increas-
ingly burdensome system may be reducing elec-
toral competition and discouraging qualified
candidates from seeking office. We are also
concerned that current financial practices may
provide some candidates with an unfair com-
petitive advantage and some donors with un-
due political influence.
In this chapter we explain these concerns
by analyzing the growth of campaign spend-
ing, the sources of funding, and the financial
patterns of recent elections. We conclude that
significant increases in the amounts spent on
campaigns and changes in the sources of fund-
ing have created a need to make resources
more easily available to candidates, especially
those challenging established incumbents.
CAMPAIGN SPENDING
One of the central questions in the cam-
paign finance debate is whether too much
money is being spent on political campaigns.
Many observers contend that election spend-
ing is too high and must be reduced. We thus
begin by reviewing the amounts spent in re-
cent elections and the major factors that have
contributed to the rising expenditures.
During the 1996 election cycle, candidates,
political committees, and other organizations
and individuals spent over $4 billion on politi-
cal campaigns.9 This spending covered not only
the races for the White House and seats in
Congress, but also contests for state and local
offices, efforts by political parties and other
organizations to register and turn out voters,
costs incurred by party organizations at all lev-
els of government, and the spending of nu-
merous political committees sponsored by in-
terest groups and other associations.
This $4 billion was almost 25 percent larger
than the amount spent in 1992. The 1996 elec-
tion thus continued a long rise in campaign
spending, which has increased more than
twelve-fold in three decades, about three times
the rate of general inflation.10 This growth in
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campaign spending has been led by the in-
creasing sums spent on campaigns for federal
office.11
In 1998, this rise in campaign expenditures
abated slightly—unfortunately, for reasons that
increase rather than diminish our concern. By
year end, Congressional candidates reportedly
spent $644 million, slightly less than during
the comparable period in 1995–1996. While
spending in Senate races appears to have risen
somewhat, to $249 million, that by House can-
didates declined from over $400 million in
1996 to $395 million. This drop in House
spending, however, reflects declining political
competition, which we address below. There
were fewer open seat races, which tend to be
more competitive and expensive, and more
uncompetitive challengers and correspond-
ingly safe incumbents.
No single factor explains the growth in cam-
paign expenditures. Changes in the size of
electoral districts, innovations in campaign
strategies, new technologies and polling tech-
niques, shifting levels of competition, and the
diverse behavior and tactics of political groups
all contribute. However, much of the growth is
the result of changes in the ways in which
candidates communicate with voters. Candi-
dates are making greater and greater use of
broadcast media and direct mail appeals to
share their views with ever larger electorates,
and these broad-based types of communica-
tion raise the costs of campaigning.
The primary factor driving higher campaign
spending has been the cost of television and
other forms of paid broadcast advertising. The
Television Bureau of Advertising estimates that
all primary and general election candidates
for federal, state, and local offices spent a total
of $50.8 million on television advertising in
1976. By 1996, candidate spending on televi-
sion had reached $400 million—an inflation-
adjusted increase of more than 200 percent
over the last five presidential election cycles.12
However, these television advertising expendi-
tures represent only about 10 percent of the
total spent on all campaigns for elective office.
Most state and local candidates do not make
extensive use of paid broadcast advertising, but
television is important in most campaigns for
federal office.
As might be expected, television advertising
has had the greatest effect on spending in presi-
dential races, where candidates must commu-
nicate with a national electorate. In 1996, for
example, President Bill Clinton and Senator
Robert Dole allocated 52 and 46 percent of
their respective campaign funds to media ad-
vertising.13 In the general election campaign,
both candidates spent over 60 percent of their
campaign funds in this manner.14
Broadcast advertising represents a smaller
share of the budget in congressional campaigns
but is still the major expense in most of these
races, especially in the Senate. Major-party Sen-
ate and House candidates in 1992 spent 42 and
27 percent of their respective funds on elec-
tronic media advertising, including payments
to media consultants, direct radio and televi-
sion air time purchases, and advertising pro-
duction costs. House candidates make less use
of television and radio advertising because it is
not a cost-effective means of campaigning in
many districts, especially those in major metro-
politan areas where media markets are much
larger than a single House district. These can-
didates make greater use of more targeted com-
munications, such as direct mail, and a signifi-
cant proportion spend no money at all on
broadcast advertising.15
Another major expense in most federal cam-
paigns is the cost of raising funds. As expendi-
tures have risen, candidates have had to devote
larger sums to fundraising. The costs vary de-
pending on the office being sought, the finan-
cial needs of a campaign, and the fundraising
methods. In general, fundraising expenses rep-
resent 10-20 percent of the costs of campaigns,
with the average higher for incumbents (who
raise more money) than for challengers.16 Ris-
ing expenditures on other campaign staples
such as mailings and travel have also contrib-
uted to the growth in campaign spending. In
addition, modern campaigns rely on an array
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of consultants and sophisticated new technolo-
gies, including polling, computerized direct
mail, and teleconferencing services, all of which
have increased costs.
We do not consider increased spending on
candidate communications per se to be a major
cause for concern. Indeed, effective communi-
cations are an essential component of a mean-
ingful campaign and are necessary to have an
informed electorate. Thirty-second television
spots may not be the best means of presenting
voters with detailed information on a
candidate’s positions or public policy propos-
als, but these ads are the most accessible and
cost-effective means available to candidates to
communicate with large segments of the popu-
lation.
Nevertheless, we are concerned about the
burdens that rising expenditures place on in-
dividual candidates as they face the rising fi-
nancial requirements of communicating with
increasingly large electorates. Increased cam-
paign spending is not simply a consequence of
new technology, changing campaign practices,
and higher costs of communication. Spending
is also driven by candidate behavior. Most can-
didates fear being outspent by an opponent
and worry about not spending enough on a
campaign. Since no politician can know with
certainty how much spending is “enough,” or
which campaign activities are most effective in
garnering support, candidates tend to spend
as much money as they can raise. This attitude
contributes to an “arms race mentality” among
candidates that, in turn, intensifies the pursuit
of campaign dollars.
SOURCES OF FUNDING
Federal candidates are required by federal
law to finance their campaigns by soliciting
contributions from limited,  publicly-disclosed
sources. In addition, FECA sets limits on the
amounts individuals, PACs, and parties may
donate to candidates and prohibits corpora-
tions, national banks, labor unions, and for-
eign nationals17 from making any contribu-
tions to federal campaigns. If a business or
labor union wants to participate in the financ-
ing of a candidate’s campaign, it must estab-
lish a PAC and make donations only from rev-
enues raised through voluntary contributions
received by the PAC. (The current contribu-
tion limits on individuals, PACs, and political
party organizations in federal elections are
shown in Table 2.)
In recent elections, most of the money in
federal races has come from the voluntary con-
tributions of individual citizens, who on aver-
age have provided about 50–60 percent of the
monies received by candidates in House and
Senate campaigns. PACs, the next largest
source, provided an average 34 percent of the
funding in House races and approximately 18
percent in the Senate. Party committees have
provided about 5 and 9 percent of the money
in House and Senate races respectively, while
personal contributions by the candidates them-
selves have accounted for about 8 percent of
financing in the House and 9 percent in the
Senate. The sources of funding for House and
Senate candidates in 1996 are shown in Figure
1 (see page 12).
In presidential races, the pattern is very
different, largely due to the option of public
funding. In presidential primary elections, most
of the money raised by candidates comes from
individual donors and the public funds gener-
ated by small individual donations. On aver-
age, more than 95 percent of the total funds
received by recent presidential candidates has
come from individuals and public funding,
with individual donations providing about two-
thirds of total receipts and public matching
funds about one-third.
PACs play little role in the financing of
presidential campaigns. Even candidates who
specifically target PAC donations as a source of
funding rarely receive more than 5 percent of
their total funds from this source. Because
PAC contributions are not eligible for public
matching funds, candidates have less incentive
Investing in the People’s Business
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STATE OR
LOCAL
POLITICAL
PARTY
(party committee)
Candidate
(or candidate
committee)
Political
Action
Committee
(multi-candidate
PAC1)
State or Local
Political Party
(party
committee)
National
Political Party
(party
committee)
INDIVIDUAL
(or partnership)
$5,000
per election2
1. Most business, labor, and ideological/issue PACs are “multi-candidate” committees under federal law, which means they have
been registered for at least six months, have at least 50 contributors, and have made contributions to at least five federal candidates.
Non-multi-candidate committees are subject to the same contribution limits as individuals.
2. Each primary and general election counts as a separate election.
3. This limit only applies to money used to support or oppose federal candidates. There are no federal limits on money that
individuals and PACs can give to political parties for non-candidate-specific “party building” activities such as issue development,
voter registration, and get-out-the-vote drives. Money used for these non-federally-regulated purposes is called “soft money.”
4. Some states impose their own limits on contributions to state and local parties, regardless of how the money is used.
5. Includes U.S. Senate and House of Representatives campaign committees, as well as parties’ national committees, each of which
may contribute $5,000 to a candidate or PAC.
SOURCE: Center for Responsive Politics, Money in Politics: Reform Principles, Problems and Proposals (Washington, D.C. 1996).
NATIONAL
POLITICAL
PARTY5
(party committee)
$1,000
per election2
CORPORATIONS
AND LABOR
UNIONS
SPECIAL LIMITS
$5,000
per calendar year
$5,000
per calendar year3
(combined limit
on contributions
to all state and
local parties)
$20,000
per calendar
year3
$25,000
per calendar year
(combined limit
on contributions
to all candidates,
PACs, and
parties)
POLITICAL
ACTION
COMMITTEE
(multi-candidate
PAC1)
$5,000
per calendar year
$15,000
per calendar
year3
$5,000
per calendar year3
(combined limit
on contributions
to all state and
local parties)
unlimited by federal law
provided money used for non-
candidate-specific activities4
(see also footnote 3 below)
prohibited
_______
prohibited
$5,000
per election
(combined limit
on contributions
to all candidates)
unlimited “transfers”
to other party committees
$5,000
per calendar year
(combined limit
on contributions
to all PACs)
_______
_______
$5,000
per election2
$17,500
to a U.S. Senate
candidate per
campaign
$5,000
per calendar year
unlimited “transfers”
to other party committees
 TABLE 2
Federal Contribution Limits
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to solicit these sources. In addition, most PACs
choose to concentrate their resources on con-
gressional campaigns, and some have a policy
of not participating in presidential races.18
However, public subsidies, financed through
a checkoff on federal individual income tax
forms, have been an important source of funds
in presidential campaigns. This system gives
presidential aspirants a strong incentive to so-
licit small individual contributions of $250 or
less, since these are matched on a dollar-for-
dollar basis with public funds. To qualify for
the matching funds, a candidate need only
raise $5,000 per state in 20 states in small con-
tributions and agree to observe aggregate and
state legal spending limits. Candidates who par-
ticipate in the program must also limit any
personal contributions to their own campaigns
to $50,000.
Almost all those who have sought a major
party’s presidential nomination have accepted
public financing. The only exceptions have
been Republicans John Connally in 1980 and
Malcolm “Steve” Forbes and Maurice Taylor in
1996; the two latter candidates financed their
campaigns largely from their personal wealth.
The availability of public funding has encour-
aged many candidates, especially lesser-known
challengers, to pursue financial strategies that
emphasize the solicitation of small gifts. This
approach has allowed such candidates, includ-
ing such diverse challengers as Republicans
Ronald Reagan and Patrick Buchanan and
Democrats Jesse Jackson and Jerry Brown, to
raise 40 percent or more of their total revenues
from public funds. Under the law, no candi-
date can receive more than half of the amount
allowed by the spending limit in public mon-
ies.
In presidential general election contests,
public funding has become the principal means
of financing a campaign. Major-party candi-
dates receive a full subsidy of the total amount
of allowable spending. (The law also sets forth
guidelines under which minor-party challeng-
ers or the nominee of a new party may qualify
for a proportionate subsidy.) When the law was
Investing in the People’s Business
1. Average of the four elections, 1990-1996.
SOURCE: Ornstein, N., Mann, T., and Malbin, M.,
Vital Statistics on Congress, 1997-1998 (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly, 1998).
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adopted in 1974, this spending ceiling was set
at $20 million, with adjustments for inflation;
by 1996 it had increased to $61.8 million. To
qualify for this subsidy, a candidate must abide
by the spending limit and agree to raise and
spend no additional private monies except for
costs incurred to comply with the law.
Since the law’s adoption, every major-party
presidential candidate has accepted public fi-
nancing in the general election. And, although
H. Ross Perot financed his independent bid
for the presidency in 1992 largely out of his
own personal wealth, as the Reform Party nomi-
nee in 1996 he accepted the partial public
subsidy for which he qualified by virtue of his
share of the vote in 1992.
The overall pattern of the sources of cam-
paign funding has not changed markedly over
the past decade, as the relative shares of total
receipts from individuals, PACs, public subsi-
dies, and other sources have remained fairly
stable. The most noteworthy change in recent
election cycles has been the increase in the
share of funds that has come from the candi-
dates’ own pockets. This change is best ex-
plained by exploring the general trends in po-
litical finance in more detail and in a broader
context.
TRENDS IN FINANCING AND
THEIR EFFECTS ON THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM
Aspiring candidates now face the prospect
of extremely costly campaigns. The average
cost of races during 1976–1998 rose from ap-
proximately $73,000 to over $500,000 for the
House and from $596,000 to $3.8 million for
the Senate. In 1976, no House campaign cost
more than $500,000; in 1998, 309 did so. Mil-
lion-dollar House campaigns, which numbered
22 as recently as 1988, nearly quintupled to
104 by 1998. In this last election, 15 of the
candidates seeking election to the Senate spent
at least $5 million. In general, House and
Senate candidates now must raise six or seven
times as much money as did their counterparts
20 years ago. The collision of these rising costs
with fixed contribution limits has made the
fundraising problem particularly acute.
The pressure to raise money is especially
strong for members of the House, most of
whom begin to seek contributions as soon as
they are sworn into office. Some legislators
have reported spending hours every day seek-
ing contributions.19 The time candidates have
to devote to fundraising on average is not
known, but one former senator has estimated
that at campaign time he and his staff spent up
to 80 percent of their time seeking contribu-
tions.20
Reducing the Quality of Governance
and the Pool of Qualified Candidates
This emphasis on fundraising undermines
the quality of our governance. We recognize
that fundraising can be a valuable part of a
democratic political process. A candidate
should spend time seeking the support of indi-
viduals and encouraging them to participate
financially in a campaign. Indeed, an
individual’s willingness to make a contribution
is an important expression of political sup-
port. But too many candidates now must spend
too much time raising too much money. In-
cumbents then spend less time serving con-
stituents, working on policy matters, engaging
in legislative debate, or performing other offi-
cial duties. Similarly, candidates seeking office
have less time available to meet with voters,
gain an understanding of voters’ concerns, and
develop views on the policy questions they may
have to address if elected.
The burden of fundraising also affects the
choices available to voters, since it discourages
some individuals from continuing in office or
from seeking office altogether. In recent years,
a growing number of retiring senators and
representatives have cited the demands of
fundraising as one of the factors in their deci-
sion to leave office. They have noted that
fundraising has become too arduous and de-
meaning, has taken too much time and energy
Financing Federal Elections
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away from the work they were elected to do,
and has diminished the quality of their repre-
sentation.
Such pronouncements by experienced leg-
islators highlight the difficulties that prospec-
tive candidates face in deciding whether to
seek office. Incumbent legislators, with an es-
tablished capacity for raising money, have a
relatively easy time compared with those who
consider challenging them. For many poten-
tial challengers, the prospect of attracting hun-
dreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars
from thousands of contributors appears a daunt-
ing and perhaps impossible task.
CED is therefore deeply concerned that the
burdens of fundraising may be limiting the
pool of qualified candidates for public office.
While many factors determine a candidacy, in-
cluding the national political environment, the
strength of a prospective opponent, and the
potential for public disclosure of an individual’s
private life, the ability to raise money is now a
central issue. Escalating campaign costs have
become a stronger barrier to entry for those
without access to money or to a broad base of
donors, while personal wealth has become a
more important qualification for effective can-
didacy. Even those with access to resources
may choose not to run rather than endure the
process. A campaign finance system should en-
courage individuals to compete for our nation’s
highest offices, not discourage them. It should
increase, not diminish, potential candidacies.
Our current system does not do so.
The Diminishing Role of the Small
Contributor
A central objective of FECA was to expand
public participation in the financing of elec-
tions by encouraging candidates to solicit mod-
est contributions from a broad base of donors.
This goal acknowledged the beneficial value of
small donors in a private system of campaign
finance. Small contributions from many indi-
vidual donors diminish the potential for cor-
ruption, since such contributions do not pro-
vide donors with excessive access to or influence
on legislators. The active involvement of small
donors also can diminish the relative influence
of large donors and organized interest groups
by stimulating broad public participation in
elections. This shift in relative influence would
promote public confidence in the political pro-
cess and encourage new donors to contribute.
The result would be a dynamic system of politi-
cal finance in which individuals see their own
contributions, however small, as a meaningful
and important form of political expression.
Our present system has not developed in
this way. It has neither led candidates to em-
phasize small contributions nor encouraged
small contributors to make them. While more
individuals contribute to federal candidates
than did so 20 years ago, there has been a clear
trend towards larger individual gifts, especially
in congressional campaigns.
This is hardly surprising. Candidates must
raise money as efficiently as possible to cope
with the rising financial demands of their cam-
paigns. Since public matching funds are not
available for small contributions to congres-
sional races, Senate and House candidates can
raise meaningful sums most efficiently by tar-
geting large donations. Building a broad base
of small donors is more time consuming and
expensive, since it requires the use of extensive
solicitation methods such as direct mail and
telemarketing.
In recent elections, congressional candidates
have increasingly relied on large individual con-
tributions. (See Figure 2). In 1984, Senate can-
didates in all elections raised about 41 percent
of their total individual contributions in dona-
tions of $500 or more. By 1998, this figure had
grown to 68 percent. The large-donor propor-
tion for House candidates rose from 34 to 56
percent over the same period.
Large contributions have become impor-
tant for both incumbents and challengers. In
1998, Senate incumbents raised almost 69 per-
cent of their individual contributions in
amounts of $500 or more and challengers 67
percent. In House races, large gifts made up 56
percent of individual receipts for both incum-
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bents and challengers. Conversely, the portion
of candidate funding derived from small con-
tributions of less than $200 is declining. Al-
though comparable data are not available for
earlier elections, the change since 1992 is note-
worthy. Senate candidates received 36 percent
of their individual funding from such small
donations in 1992, but by 1998 only about 23
percent. For House candidates the proportion
declined similarly, from about 39 to 29 per-
cent.21
Moreover, these data overstate the role of
small contributors in congressional campaigns,
since they are based on individual contributions,
not the aggregate amount given by an indi-
vidual contributor. We can safely assume that
some of these donors made more than one
contribution to a candidate and thus gave more
than $200. Similarly, some multiple donors cer-
tainly made contributions totaling more than
$500 that are not reflected in the large-contri-
butions data.
The Growing Influence and Concen-
tration of Political Action Committees
A more prominent change in the campaign
finance system since the adoption of FECA has
been the emergence of PACs as a major source
of funding in congressional elections. In the
two decades after FECA was adopted, the num-
ber of PACs grew from approximately 990 in
1976 to almost 4,600 in 1998. The greatest
growth has come in the number of corporate
PACs, which rose from 433 in 1976 to almost
1,800 in 1998, and in the number of PACs
organized by ideological groups, known as
“non-connected” PACs, which increased from
about 100 to approximately 1,400. During the
same period, the number of trade association
PACs rose from 489 to 900, while PACs orga-
nized by labor unions grew from slightly more
than 200 to 348.
While PACs are commonly cast in public
discussions as single-interest organizations or
“special interests,” they collectively represent
thousands of different interests and tens of
thousands of individual contributors. All PAC
monies contributed to candidates must come
from voluntary donations; a committee can
request, but not require, such donations from
the members of a corporation or group with
which it is associated. PACs thus provide small
donors with a means of participating in the
financing of campaigns through a broader
group that represents their concerns. In this
way, they have increased public participation
in the financing of elections and offered indi-
viduals a valuable means of exercising their
rights of free speech and political association.
Over the past two decades, the amount of
money donated by PACs to House and Senate
candidates has increased significantly, rising
from about $23 million in 1976 to about $216
million in 1998. PACs have now become a ma-
jor source of funding for federal candidates.
Candidates have a strong incentive to pursue
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this funding, since PACs may give five times as
much as individuals to a federal campaign.
Most PACs, however, give less than the maxi-
mum permissible contribution of $5,000 per
election to the candidates they support.
A substantial share of PAC funding is associ-
ated with corporations. In 1998, PACs related
to publicly and privately held corporations do-
nated $76 million to federal candidates com-
pared with $61 million donated by trade asso-
ciation PACs, $44 million by labor PACs, and
$28 million by non-connected PACs.22 The
average total contributed by the many corpo-
rate PACs was $42,800, as compared with an
average of approximately $126,000 by labor
PACs and $20,000 by non-connected PACs.
These aggregate statistics, however, mask
the great diversity in resources among PACs.
In 1998, 55 percent of the more than 4,500
PACs active in the cycle made contributions
totaling less than $5,000, with 35 percent mak-
ing no contributions at all. (See Table 3). In
fact, less than four percent of all PACs made
total contributions of more than $250,000. This
small group of 179 PACs was responsible for 56
percent of all federal PAC contributions in the
1998 cycle. This disproportionate role of a rela-
tively small group of well-financed PACs is typi-
cal of recent experience.
PACs are pragmatic participants in the po-
litical process. Approximately 70 percent of
their contributions goes to incumbents, while
the remaining 30 percent is distributed among
open seat candidates and challengers.23 While
PACs do not support only incumbents, and the
PAC community is too diverse to be strictly
categorized, their donations are a major source
of the resource advantage held by incumbents.24
In 1998, PACs gave incumbents in House races
on average almost $8 for every $1 contributed
to challengers; in Senate contests the ratio was
over $5 to $1. Corporate and trade association
PACs especially favor incumbents, in large part
because they seek access to legislators who will
decide issues that may affect their interests.
The growth in PACs has been a cause for
alarm among many advocates of reform, lead-
ing to charges that PAC donations are a major
factor in determining legislators’ votes and that
PACs therefore exert undue influence in the
political process. We have not found the direct
influence of PACs on legislative voting to be as
significant as many claim. The charges of “vote
buying” by PACs are not well supported. In-
deed, most studies that have examined the
matter have found little relationship between
PAC contributions and voting behavior, which
is best explained by a legislator’s ideology, party
affiliation, and constituency interests.25
However, because a small proportion of
PACs is responsible for most of the money
donated to federal candidates, this concentra-
tion of financial influence does provide privi-
leged access that raises serious questions about
the role of PACs in the political process. Even
if PAC contributions do not directly affect leg-
islators’ votes, they undoubtedly provide im-
portant influence. Indeed, committee or floor
votes are but one indicator of the influence
PACs may exert. Access can influence legisla-
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None 1,620 35.2 0.0 0.0
Less than 5 927 20.2 1.9 0.9
5-50 1,257 27.3 25.0 11.6
50-100 330 7.2 23.5 10.9
100-250 285 6.2 44.2 20.4
250-500 94 2.0 33.2 15.3
500-1,000 51 1.1 35.7 16.5
More than 1,000 34 0.7 52.6 24.3
Total 4,598 100 216.1 100
TABLE 3
PACs Classified by the Size of Their
Total Contributions, 1997–1998
Amount of a
PAC’s Total
Contributions
($ thousands)
Number
of PACs
Percent
of All
PACs
Total
Contribu-
tions
($ millions)
Percent
of All
PAC
Spending
Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
SOURCE: Based on data through November 23, 1998 reported
by the Federal Election Commission.
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tive decisions in a variety of ways that take place
well before any committee or floor votes are
taken. For example, a PAC may seek to ensure
that a particular bill never makes it onto a
subcommittee or committee agenda; it may be
asked for its view on a particular bill or be
granted an opportunity to testify at a commit-
tee hearing; or it may be allowed to help de-
velop detailed and obscure legislative provi-
sions designed to benefit a specific industry,
business, group, or cause. Such influence is
difficult to quantify, but it highlights our con-
cern about the rise in PAC contributions and
the disproportionate influence of the small
group of PACs that contribute most of the
money.
Diminished Competition:
Underfunded Challengers
Election results demonstrate the powers of
congressional incumbency. Challengers face
formidable obstacles and usually lose, espe-
cially in the House. Money, of course, plays a
major role in these outcomes. Incumbents nor-
mally enjoy a very large advantage in campaign
fundraising and are therefore capable, in most
instances, of outspending their opponents by
substantial margins.
However, money isn’t everything. Even
highly competitive challengers characteristically
spend significantly less than their incumbent
opponents. House challengers who earned at
least 40 percent of the two-party vote in 1998
spent an average of $639,000 on their cam-
paigns, as compared with almost $1 million for
the incumbents they opposed. Of the nine chal-
lengers who beat House and Senate incum-
bents in 1998, seven spent less than their oppo-
nents. This is consistent with long historical
experience. A survey of the 1,540 House races
from 1976 to 1990 in which an incumbent
faced a major party challenger in successive
elections concluded that, while money is essen-
tial, challengers do not as a rule have to spend
as much as incumbents to win.26
Thus, while incumbent spending clearly af-
fects election outcomes, the most important
consideration is whether a challenger can raise
enough money to finance a viable campaign.
Money means more to a challenger than an
incumbent because a challenger is less well-
known. A challenger has a more pressing need
to generate awareness of his or her candidacy
among voters, to be seen as a viable candidate,
and to communicate positions effectively.
Nevertheless, it is troubling that the resource
disparity between incumbents and challengers
has increased greatly in both absolute size and
proportion in recent years. (Both are arguably
important to the competitiveness of elections.)
In 1976, the average House challenger spent
about $51,000, or 65 percent as much as the
$79,000 spent by the average incumbent. By
1998, the discrepancy had grown to roughly
$265,000 versus $657,000, or 40 percent. (See
Table 4, page 18.) In Senate races, the ratio of
incumbent to challenger spending has not in-
creased significantly, since Senate challengers
tend to be higher-profile candidates who often
have held elective office and have begun can-
didacies with more established financial sup-
port. However, the absolute advantage of Sen-
ate incumbents also has widened. In 1976,
Senate incumbents spent on average $172,000
more than challengers; by 1998, the gap had
grown to $1.6 million.
In this context, recent financing trends, es-
pecially in House elections, reveal an alarming
problem—challengers who simply are not fi-
nancially competitive. The majority of House
challengers now raise and spend so little that
they cannot wage a viable campaign. In 1998,
just under half of the House challengers raised
$100,000, and only about one-third raised
$200,000. As a result, most House elections
were financially uncompetitive. Average spend-
ing by Democratic challengers was $270,000,
compared with $718,000 by their incumbent
opponents; Republican challengers on aver-
age spent $260,000, while their opponents spent
$588,000. In fact, 60 percent of House incum-
bents either had no significant opposition or
outspent their opponents by a margin of 10-
to-1 or more.27 Figure 3 (page 19) shows the
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of the two-party vote. Second, challengers with
very little funding benefit greatly from addi-
tional resources, on average, but such gains
diminish sharply as they pass a threshold in the
range of $200,000. Finally, to move well into
the competitive range of 40 percent or more of
the two-party vote, challengers typically need
roughly $300,000 or more in resources.28
The Growing Reliance on
Personal Wealth
In its Buckley v. Valeo decision in 1976, the
Supreme Court ruled that candidates who are
not receiving public subsidies may contribute
as much money as they desire to their own
campaigns. In recent elections, an increasing
number of affluent candidates have taken ad-
vantage of this option to meet the fundraising
requirements facing their campaigns.
As indicated by Figure 4, page 20, the
amounts contributed by congressional candi-
dates to their own general election campaigns
have increased significantly, especially in the
more costly Senate contests. Self-financing in
Senate contests has risen from 5 percent in
1988 to 11 percent in 1998, and the total
amount contributed has roughly tripled from
about $10 million to $28 million.29 In House
races the share of self-funding has been more
stable, but the amount contributed neverthe-
less has more than doubled over the same de-
cade, from $12.5 million to nearly $26 million.
This growth is not due simply to larger amounts
spent by a few individuals. Many more candi-
dates are now helping to finance their own
campaigns. In all primary and general election
campaigns in 1998, 18 Senate candidates and
69 House candidates put $100,000 or more of
their own money into their campaigns, either
through direct contributions or loans.
Almost all self-contributions are made by
challengers or individuals contesting open seats.
In campaigns from 1988 to 1998, only 1.6 per-
cent of the funds raised by congressional in-
cumbents has come from their own funds—2.6
percent in the Senate and 1 percent in the
House. In 1998, only one Senate and two House
relationship between campaign spending by
individual challengers and their share of the
two-party vote in the 1998 House elections.
The relationship between spending and votes
is not tight, of course, because of the many
other factors that affect elections. Neverthe-
less, several points are clear from the graph.
First, a very large proportion of the challengers
spent less than $200,000 and were simply
uncompetitive, receiving less than 40 percent
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TABLE 4
Congressional Candidates:
Average Expenditures, 1976–1998
HOUSE
SENATE
SOURCE: Norman J. Ornstein, et al., Vital Statistics on Congress,
1984-1985 (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institue,
1984), pp. 65-66, 69-70, and Vital Statistics on Congress, 1997-
1998 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998),
pp 81-83, 84-85. 1998 data are preliminary FEC data.
Thousands of Dollars
Millions of Dollars
1976 73 79 51 125 65
1980 153 165 122 202 74
1984 241 279 162 362 58
1988 273 379 120 465 32
1992 408 595 167 436 28
1996 517 679 287 654 42
1998 512 657 265 777 40
1976 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.8 72
1980 1.1 1.3 0.8 1.1 65
1984 2.3 2.5 1.2 5.0 49
1988 2.8 3.7 1.8 2.9 49
1992 2.9 3.9 1.8 2.9 47
1996 3.6 4.2 3.1 3.3 74
1998 3.8 4.7 3.1 2.7 66
All Open Challenger/
Year Candidates Incumbents Challengers Seats Incumbent
(percent)
All Open Challenger/
Year Candidates Incumbents Challengers Seats Incumbent
(percent)
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Figure 3
Campaign Spending and Election Results: Major Party House Challengers, 1998*
Average Relationship of Challenger’s Vote and Spending
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Challenger’s Vote (percent of two-party vote)
*Includes all major party challengers with reported expenditures in 1998 House races.
SOURCE: FEC 1998 election data as available on February 15, 1999 at <www.fec.gov>. Most spending records cover the period
through December 31, 1998.
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incumbents gave $100,000 or more to their
campaigns. In contrast, personal funds ac-
counted for 23 and 17 percent of the money
raised by challengers and open-seat candidates
in the Senate and House respectively in this
last election.
Self-financed candidates have also become
a feature of the presidential race. The best-
known example is H. Ross Perot, who spent
close to $64 million from his personal wealth
to finance his bid for the presidency in 1992;
he spent an additional $8.2 million in 1996 in
support of his Reform Party, under whose ban-
ner he once again ran for president. Two other
candidates also spent large sums of their own
money seeking the 1996 Republican nomina-
tion. Malcolm “Steve” Forbes catapulted into
the top tier of contenders on the strength of
the $37 million he spent on his campaign.
Another contender, Maurice Taylor, president
of Titan Wheel International, spent $6.5 mil-
lion, but was less successful in launching his
candidacy.30
Self-financing helps resolve the basic prob-
lem most challengers face—raising enough
money quickly to mount a competitive cam-
paign. A candidate who can afford to contrib-
ute or loan $100,000 to $250,000 or even more
will have the “seed money” needed to launch a
campaign and perhaps gain the credibility
needed to be recognized as a serious candidate
by political insiders and even members of the
public at large. In addition, such candidates do
not have to incur the substantial costs required
to start a fundraising effort and therefore will
have more money available to spend on other
campaign activities. Finally, and most impor-
tant, a candidate who relies exclusively or largely
on personal funds is not constrained by FECA
contribution and spending limits. The only
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constraint is the amount of personal resources
the candidate is willing to commit.
This financial advantage, of course, does
not always translate into victory at the polls. Of
the 87 Senate and House candidates who con-
tributed $100,000 or more to their election
campaigns in 1998, only 11 were successful—
providing further evidence that money alone
does not win elections.
We believe that, while individuals should
be free to use their own resources in cam-
paigns, the growing role of personal wealth
raises serious issues with respect to the future
health of our federal electoral process. It di-
minishes the role of individual citizens and
discourages broader public participation in
campaign funding, since individual donors are
less likely to consider a contribution meaning-
ful when a candidate assumes primary financ-
ing responsibility. The increasing reliance on
self-financing also makes personal wealth a
more important qualification for seeking pub-
lic office. National party leaders naturally seek
out wealthy candidates to run against better-
known, better-financed incumbents. This trend
further discourages less-affluent individuals
from becoming candidates, since they would
now face two major financial hurdles—a pri-
mary opponent with a substantial financial ad-
vantage and a well-financed incumbent. Indeed,
the prospect of challengers with large personal
resources may also discourage some incum-
bents from seeking reelection.
Supporting Challengers:
The Role of Political Parties
The other major source of campaign money
that primarily benefits challengers is party
money. In allocating their campaign resources,
party organizations have one overriding goal:
to maximize the number of seats their party
holds in Congress. While it might be assumed
that party leaders would favor incumbents in
distributing their resources, the reality is just
the opposite. Instead, party committees focus
on candidates in close contests or marginal
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Figure 4
Self-Financing of Congressional Candidates, 1988–1998
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districts where party assistance might make a
difference in the outcome. They also concen-
trate on challengers who can wage competitive
campaigns against an entrenched incumbent
of the opposite party.
Like other sources of campaign funding,
party committees are limited in the amount of
direct assistance they may provide to their can-
didates. But the law acknowledges the unique
relationship between parties and their candi-
dates by allowing party committees also to spend
money in coordination with their candidates. This
“coordinated spending” is also subject to FECA
limits; the general ceiling is set at 2 cents times
the voting-age population, adjusted for infla-
tion. In 1996, national party committees were
allowed to spend $12.3 million on behalf of a
presidential candidate; the 1998 congressional
limits were $32,550 for House candidates
($65,100 in a single-district state) and from
$65,100 in the smallest states to $1.5 million in
California for Senate candidates.
While the Supreme Court in Buckley struck
down most other limits on spending in federal
elections, these party limits were not specifi-
cally challenged in that landmark case and
have remained in effect. However, these re-
strictions are now being challenged in the case
of Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commit-
tee v. Federal Election Commission.31In June 1996,
the Supreme Court ruled in this case that party
committees may make unlimited independent
expenditures in connection with federal elec-
tions, but it did not render an opinion on the
constitutionality of the limits on coordinated ex-
penditures. This constitutional challenge was
remanded to the District Court, which struck
down such limits in February, 1999. At this
time it is uncertain whether this decision will
be appealed by the FEC.
However, the limits on coordinated spend-
ing have significantly constrained the direct
assistance parties can provide to candidates.
The ceilings are so low that a party committee
cannot legally pay the postage costs to send
one letter to each eligible voter in a district or
state. In fact, they are so low that a party com-
mittee could not even cover the costs of a letter
mailed to each registered party supporter.
Despite these constraints, parties place great
emphasis on assisting their candidates, espe-
cially those in the most competitive contests.
Since 1990, the Democratic and Republican
parties have each spent at least $20 million to
$30 million per election cycle on coordinated
expenditures. This represents a substantial in-
crease from the levels of the early 1980s, when
the Democrats typically spent $3-5 million and
the Republicans $10-15 million. By contrast,
the major parties spend only 1 to 2 percent of
their federal funds on direct contributions to
candidates, or an average recently of $2-3.5
million per election.32
Most of the coordinated expenditures by
both parties are made on behalf of non-incum-
bents. In 1996, the Democrats gave non-in-
cumbents 85 percent of their total coordinated
expenditures in Senate races and 80 percent in
House races, with much of the largest share
going to open-seat candidates. Almost all of
the remaining money spent on behalf of in-
cumbents went to those in jeopardy of losing
their seats. The Republicans’ coordinated
spending also favored non-incumbents, al-
though more was spent defending incumbents
because of the unusually large number of in-
cumbents involved in close races. (Most of the
large freshman class in the House won in 1994
with 55 percent of the vote or less.) Even so,
the Senate and House Republican committees
each disbursed close to two-thirds of their co-
ordinated funds to assist non-incumbents.
These 1996 allocations are similar to the pat-
terns that characterized previous cycles.33
Because party committees direct their coor-
dinated expenditures to help the maximum
number of candidates win election, party fund-
ing helps to make elections more competitive.
It enhances the ability of non-incumbents to
increase their name recognition and make their
views known to the electorate. In this way, par-
ties improve the choices available to the elec-
torate and enhance the competitiveness of the
electoral process.
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III.
Recent Innovations in
Political Finance: Soft
Money and Issue Advocacy
Efforts to regulate the flow of campaign
money often produce unintended and unfore-
seen consequences. Candidates and their staffs,
as well as party committees and interest groups,
have responded to regulation with imaginative
innovations, producing new financial practices
unanticipated by lawmakers. The law has also
been interpreted by the courts and administra-
tive agencies in unexpected ways, producing
new directives that also have encouraged new
financial strategies. Both these developments
have dramatically increased the flow of money
in federal elections and significantly under-
mined the effectiveness of our federal cam-
paign finance laws.
SOFT MONEY
Faced with rising campaign costs and an
increased demand for money, yet constrained
by contribution limits and, in some cases,
spending limits, politicians and organized
groups have sought additional ways outside
the scope of FECA to finance political activity.
Party committees, in particular, have pursued
new methods of assisting candidates.
The most controversial of these activities
has been the development of “non-federal”
funding, or “soft money” — funds raised by
national party committees to finance party-
building activities and other expenditures.
These committees rely in large part on the
access they can provide to federal officials, or
on the more direct influence of federal office-
holders and candidates, to solicit the large sums
from corporations, labor unions, and other
donors that provide most of their soft money.
They then distribute a share of these monies to
state party committees, who usually spend these
funds in accordance with national party direc-
tives. Soft money fundraising is therefore pri-
marily a “top-down” system, with the national
party organizations playing the central role.
Because these funds are not supposed to be
used for activities related to federal elections,
they are not subject to the contribution and
expenditure limits imposed on parties by FECA.
National party committees may thus raise and
spend unlimited amounts of soft money. They
may also solicit unlimited soft money contribu-
tions from sources that are banned from mak-
ing contributions in federal elections, espe-
cially corporations and labor unions.
The Origins of Soft Money
Soft money was not recognized as a form of
party finance under the original provisions of
FECA. In fact, FECA contained only one nar-
row exception to the party contribution limits.
Parties could receive contributions in unlim-
ited amounts from unlimited sources for “build-
ing funds” established to pay for new buildings
or headquarters structures. Outside of this
“bricks and mortar” provision, all monies re-
ceived by parties were subject to federal limits.
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By 1980, the year of the second presidential
election conducted under FECA, these tough
prohibitions on party receipts and expendi-
tures had begun to erode, and the door had
been opened to unregulated party financial
activity. This occurred as a result of problems
experienced in the 1976 election and adminis-
trative decisions of the Federal Election Com-
mission (FEC) that altered the kinds of money
parties could raise.34
In the 1976 election, party leaders quickly
recognized that the activities they traditionally
financed in conjunction with national elections
were significantly hindered by the new system
of public financing and spending limits for
presidential campaigns. Under the new law,
expenditures by a party to help the presiden-
tial ticket might be considered in-kind contri-
butions to the candidate or election-related
expenditures that were no longer allowed. Par-
ties therefore looked to the presidential cam-
paigns to fund much of the paraphernalia used
in traditional volunteer activities, such as signs,
bumper stickers, and buttons, as well as voter
registration and turnout activities. But the presi-
dential campaigns, now faced with limited funds
and wanting to maximize the resources avail-
able for television advertising, did not allocate
substantial amounts to these other activities
that parties considered important. As a result,
party leaders appealed to Congress after the
election to change the law so that they could
finance volunteer and party-building activities
without risking a violation of the law.
Congress responded to these concerns and
in 1979 amended FECA to exempt very spe-
cific, narrowly defined party activities from the
definitions of “expenditure” and “contribution”
contained in the Act. Thus, parties were al-
lowed to spend unlimited amounts on grass-
roots, party-building activities and generic party
activities such as voter registration and turnout
drives. They were also permitted to spend un-
limited amounts on such traditional campaign
materials as bumper stickers, buttons, and slate
cards. But the Congress did not change the
rules on party fundraising: the monies spent
on these activities had to come from “hard
money” donations subject to federal contribu-
tion limits. Congress also specified that none
of these unlimited expenditures could pay for
mass public communications, such as direct
mail or television advertising.
At the same time that Congress was making
these changes in the law, party officials were
asking the FEC to decide another set of issues
related to general party activities. The parties
argued that their organizations were involved
not only in federal but also in non-federal elec-
tion activity, such as supporting candidates in
state-level races and building party support at
the state and local level. Furthermore, many
generic party activities, such as voter registra-
tion and turnout drives, are conducted to help
both federal and non-federal candidates. The
parties therefore contended that the finance
rules should recognize the non-federal role of
party organizations and allow parties to par-
tially finance their political activity with monies
subject only to state laws.
The FEC responded to these questions with
a series of rulings that recognized the non-
federal role of state and national party organi-
zations. These rulings allowed parties to finance
a share of their activities with money raised
under state law if they maintained separate
accounts for federal and non-federal funds.
Subsequent rules established complex alloca-
tion formulas that determined the shares of
particular expenditures that had to be allo-
cated to federal and non-federal accounts.
Thus was born the distinction between
“hard” and “soft” money. Hard (federal) money
is subject to federal contribution limits and is
the only type of funding that can be used to
support federal candidates directly. All contri-
butions to federal candidates, coordinated ex-
penditures, or independent expenditures made
in federal contests must use hard money. Soft
(non-federal) money is exempt from federal
limits and can be used to finance general party
activities, including such activities as voter reg-
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istration drives, even though these activities
may indirectly influence federal elections, for
example, by encouraging more party members
to vote.
The FEC’s decisions essentially freed par-
ties to engage in unlimited fundraising as long
as they abided by the technical requirements
of the law. They could now raise (and spend)
monies obtained from sources that were banned
from participating in federal elections or from
individuals and PACs that had already donated
the legal maximum. These changes in the rules
thus gave parties a strong incentive to raise soft
money.
The Growth of Soft Money
Parties quickly adapted to the new regula-
tory environment. At first, soft money was pri-
marily raised in presidential election years for
use on voter registration and turnout opera-
tions. But the parties soon expanded the role
of soft money by expanding the range of activi-
ties that could be paid for with these funds.
They also began to raise soft money more ag-
gressively, soliciting ever larger sums.
Since 1980, soft money has grown rapidly.
In 1980, the Republican and Democratic na-
tional party committees spent a total of about
$19 million in soft money, with the Republi-
cans disbursing $15 million and the Democrats
$4 million. Much the same pattern existed in
1984. By 1988, however, the amount of soft
money had more than doubled to $45 million,
shared about equally between the two major
parties. By 1992, soft money had almost doubled
again to $80 million, with the Republicans
spending $47 million to the Democrats’ $33
million.35
Yet the soft money raised in those elections
pales in comparison to that raised in 1996 and
1998. In the Presidential election cycle of 1996
the two major parties raised $262 million in
soft money, more than three times the amount
garnered only four years earlier. (See Figure
5.) The Republican committees solicited more
than $138 million and the Democratic com-
mittees $124 million. In contrast, hard money
increased much more slowly. Democratic hard
money increased by 59 percent over 1992, and
Republican funds by 71 percent.
Similarly, soft money fundraising in 1998
was up dramatically over the previous off-year
election cycle of 1994. As of 20 days after the
election, the national party committees had
raised $201 million in soft money, close to
twice the $107 million they had raised in the
entire 1994 election cycle. The Republicans
had raised $111.3 million, compared with $52.5
million in 1994, an increase of 112 percent; the
Democrats had raised $89.4 million, 82 per-
cent more than the $49.1 million four years
earlier.36
Figure 5
Political Party Spending, 1976–1996
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The share of total party funds represented
by soft money has also increased substantially.
In 1992, for example, soft money constituted
26 percent of the receipts of all three Demo-
cratic national party committees. By 1998 the
soft-money share had risen to 37 percent. For
the three Republican national party commit-
tees, the proportion rose from 20 percent to 29
percent during the same six years.
The Sources of Soft Money
Soft money has grown rapidly because both
parties have been increasingly successful in so-
liciting large soft money gifts. Since at least
1988, both parties have had organized pro-
grams to recruit large donors. In 1992, for
example, the DNC and RNC raised a total of
$63 million in soft money, about 30 percent of
which came from contributors of $100,000 or
more.37 The parties have also been successful
in soliciting major contributions from corpora-
tions and, primarily in the Democratic Party,
labor unions. The parties have thus succeeded
in gaining access to contributions from sources
and in amounts that were prohibited by the
campaign finance reforms of the 1970s.
According to an analysis by the FEC, the
parties have raised an increasingly large num-
ber of contributions in this manner. During
the 1992 election cycle, the national party com-
mittees’ soft money accounts accepted at least
381 individual contributions in excess of
$20,000 (the annual federal party contribution
limit) and about 11,000 contributions from
sources that are prohibited from giving in fed-
eral elections, particularly corporations and la-
bor unions. By the 1996 election cycle, these
figures had more than doubled. The national
party committees received nearly 1,000 indi-
vidual contributions of more than $20,000 and
approximately 27,000 contributions from
sources prohibited from giving hard money.38
The business community is by far the most
important source of soft money, as shown in
Table 5 (page 26). According to one indepen-
dent analysis, businesses provided $55.9 mil-
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lion of the $102.2 million in soft money re-
ceived by national party committees during
the 1994 election cycle. In 1998, these organi-
zations had donated more than $105 million
of the more than $200 million received through
October. The vast majority of this money came
from corporations rather than trade associa-
tions or other incorporated organizations.
These figures do not, of course, include indi-
vidual contributions made by members of the
business community.
A substantial share of this money came from
large contributions. In 1998 at least 218 corpo-
rations donated more than $100,000, compared
with 96 that gave this amount in 1994. Sixteen
corporations gave $500,000 or more, whereas
only four gave at this level four years earlier.39
Further evidence of the role of business
contributions in the growth of soft money is
found in a 1997 analysis conducted by the Los
Angeles Times, which found that soft money
donations made by the 544 largest public and
private U.S. companies had more than tripled
between 1992 and 1996, growing from $16
million to $51 million. In comparison, the con-
tributions made by PACs maintained by these
companies rose only from $43 million to $52
million.40
The largest soft money donors tend to be
companies or industries that are heavily regu-
lated by the federal government or those whose
profits can be dramatically affected by govern-
ment policy. For example, according to the
Center for Responsive Politics’ analysis of 1996
donors:41
Tobacco companies and their executives,
who have faced concerted federal efforts to
strengthen the regulations governing to-
bacco sales and advertising, as well as the
possibility of congressional action to settle
ongoing lawsuits, gave a total of $6.83 mil-
lion in 1996, with $5.77 million donated to
the Republicans and $1.06 million to the
Democrats. This group was led by Philip
Morris, which donated the most soft money
of all contributors in 1996, giving a total of
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about $3 million, $2.52 million of which went
to the Republicans. RJR Nabisco gave a total
of $1.44 million, with $1.18 million going to
the Republicans.
  Telecommunications companies, in the
midst of deregulation and interested in an
array of proposals that will affect the indus-
try, contributed $6.28 million in soft money,
almost equally divided between Democrats
($3.2 million) and Republicans ($3.1 mil-
lion). The leader in this group was the com-
munications giant AT&T, which gave about
$552,000 to Republicans and $422,000 to
Democrats, for a total of $974,000; one of its
major competitors, MCI Telecommunica-
tions, gave $964,000, with almost two-thirds
of that amount, $607,000 going to the Demo-
crats. NYNEX, one of the regional telephone
companies gave $651,000, $411,000 of which
went to the Republicans.
    The oil and gas industry, which is affected
by a wide range of federal laws and environ-
mental regulations, gave $9.13 million in
soft money, $6.59 million of which went to
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55.9 58.7 105.7 60.0
(50.1) (52.6) (92.2) (52.3)
(1.0) (1.0) (1.1) (0.6)
(4.9) (5.1) (12.4) (7.0)
20.4 21.4 42.9 24.3
4.7 4.9 7.8 4.4
2.9 3.1 1.6 0.9
0.5 0.5 0.6 0.3
10.8 11.3 17.6 10.0
95.3 100 176.2 100
6.9 44.3
102.2 220.5
TABLE 5
Sources of Soft Money Contributions: 1994 and 1998 Elections
NOTE: Figures based on unadjusted FEC data as reported by the Campaign Reform Project at http://206.239.183.87/
SoftMoneyReport.htm, January 28, 1999. The total is higher than that reported in the text because the latter adjusts for transfers
between committees.
TYPE OF DONOR                                                    1993-1994                                          1997-1998
Amount
Donated
($ millions)
Business: Total
     Corporations
     Individual Incorporated Entities
     Trade Associations
Individuals
Labor Organizations
Other Organizations and Groups
Political Candidate Committees
Political Parties
Total Itemized Contributions
Unitemized Contributions
Total Contributions
Percent of
Itemized
Receipts
Amount
Donated
($ millions)
Percent of
Itemized
Receipts
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the Republicans, $2.54 million to the Demo-
crats. Atlantic Richfield and its executives,
the leading donor in this group, gave a total
of $1.25 million, with $764,000 sent to Re-
publican committees and $486,000 to Demo-
cratic committees.
These examples, which are not atypical,
demonstrate how ineffective the party contri-
bution limits established by FECA have become
in practice. Instead of relying solely on contri-
butions limited in amount from individuals
and PACs, parties now raise funds in amounts
subject to no limits, receiving a substantial share
of their funding from donors who give hun-
dreds of thousands of dollars in each election
cycle.
The Effects of Soft Money on the
Political System
The rise of soft money has greatly increased
the flow of money in national elections and has
turned party fundraising into a frenetic and
never ending chase for large contributions. As
the range of party activities financed with soft
money has increased, party organizations have
engaged in more aggressive and directed ef-
forts to raise soft dollars. The parties therefore
have sought ever larger amounts from soft
money donors and have pursued new sources
of soft money contributions, especially among
members of the business community.
One of the primary ways parties obtain very
large contributions is by providing donors with
access to federal elected officials. The most
highly publicized and controversial example of
the access and privilege afforded soft money
donors is the use of the White House during
the 1996 election cycle as a venue for dinners
and other events with President Clinton. While
money was not raised at these events, they were
clearly designed to reward past soft money do-
nors and stimulate future contributions. Pub-
lished reports of these sessions sparked a con-
troversy that raised serious questions as to
whether access to the White House was for sale
and fueled public cynicism about the influ-
ence enjoyed by wealthy contributors. Further
examination of the Democratic Party’s public
disclosure reports revealed that the Democratic
National Committee had deposited at least
$3 million in illegal or questionable contribu-
tions into their soft money accounts.
The Democratic Party’s 1996 fundraising
activities, however, are only one example of
the consequences of unrestricted party
fundraising. In recent years, both major par-
ties have offered soft money donors access to
elected leaders in exchange for contributions.
White House officials and congressional lead-
ers have been asked to appear at party soft
money fund-raisers, participate in party-spon-
sored policy briefings, attend weekend retreats
with donors, and play a role in other small
group meetings. Elected officials have even
been recruited by the party committees to so-
licit soft money donations from potential con-
tributors, especially from their own financial
supporters and others with whom they have
relationships.
Federal officeholders have thus assisted their
parties in raising funds for issue advocacy ad-
vertising, voter registration, election day turn-
out drives, and other activities that directly
benefit their own campaigns for office. They
have also participated in fundraising efforts
directed at donors whose interests are directly
influenced by federal policy decisions. Such
activities place undue pressure on potential
donors. Businesses, in particular, are induced
to contribute to keep up with their competi-
tors or ensure their own access to lawmakers.
Given the size and source of most soft money
contributions, the public cannot help but be-
lieve that these donors enjoy special influence
and receive special favors. The suspicion of
corruption deepens public cynicism and di-
minishes public confidence in government.
More important, these activities raise the likeli-
hood of actual corruption. Indeed, we believe
it is only a matter of time before another major
scandal develops within the soft money system.
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ISSUE ADVOCACY
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, soft
money was considered to be the major “loop-
hole” that had to be closed in order to ensure
an effective system of regulation. In 1996, it
was joined by another innovation in political
finance known as “issue advocacy advertising.”
Issue advocacy is the general term used to
cover three distinct types of speech: advocacy
of policy positions, information about issues,
and, most critically, specific information about
candidates’ voting records, conduct, and policy
views. It is to be distinguished from “express
advocacy,” which is speech that directly advo-
cates the election or defeat of a particular can-
didate. In Buckley, the Supreme Court distin-
guished between information about issues and
candidates and the advocacy of election or de-
feat of candidates, noting that the latter is the
particular focus of federal campaign finance
regulation.42 It decided that Congress has the
power to regulate only political spending that
“expressly advocates the election or defeat of a
particular federal candidate.” The court fur-
ther noted that express advocacy can be identi-
fied by the use of certain words in any speech
or communication, such as “vote for,” “elect,”
“defeat,” or “support.”
Since Buckley, courts have had to confront
the question of how best to limit the scope of
campaign finance regulation in order to pro-
tect free speech. In resolving this issue, the
courts have sought a “bright-line” standard to
distinguish express advocacy from issue advo-
cacy, so that advocates can know what is al-
lowed and potential First Amendment prob-
lems can be avoided. Most courts have
embraced a narrow test that provides the great-
est possible protection to free speech—the
“magic words” test that was suggested by the
Supreme Court in Buckley. According to these
rulings, as long as a message or advertisement
does not contain the specific words listed in
Buckley as indicative of express advocacy, it is
not express advocacy and is not subject to the
restrictions of FECA. In recent years, the First,
Second, and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have all adopted this approach.43
The FEC has argued for a broader standard
that recognizes the context of a message. In its
view, a message or advertisement should be
considered express advocacy, and therefore be
subject to federal regulation, if it presents an
“electioneering message” that is clearly in-
tended to encourage the audience to support
or oppose a particular candidate for federal
office. This is the general approach that has
been adopted in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In Furgatch v. FEC, the Ninth Circuit
Court ruled that speech without the “magic
words” could amount to express advocacy if,
when “read as a whole, and with limited refer-
ence to external events,” a message is suscep-
tible to no other reasonable interpretation than
as “an exhortation to vote for or against a spe-
cific candidate.”44 The FEC has adopted a simi-
lar approach in drafting regulations intended
to govern issue advocacy expenditures. But
these regulations have been successfully chal-
lenged in the First Circuit, where the Court
affirmed a District Court ruling that the guide-
lines were unconstitutional on their face be-
cause they moved beyond the “magic words”
test established in earlier cases.45
The Rise of Issue Advocacy Spending
The judicial decisions distinguishing express
advocacy from issue advocacy have provided
individuals, organizations, and party commit-
tees with an easy way to circumvent federal
campaign finance restraints. By crafting adver-
tisements to avoid the “magic words,” parties
and other organizations can engage in com-
munications that are not subject to the provi-
sions of FECA, even when those communica-
tions are designed to influence the voting in
federal elections. The sponsors of such ads can
therefore finance these communications with
funds drawn from any source without any limit.
They need disclose neither their spending nor
the sources of their funding.
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During the 1996 election cycle, a wide array
of party organizations and other groups seized
on the issue advocacy distinction and spent
tens of millions of dollars on advertisements
carefully designed to avoid the restrictions of
federal law. Most of these ads featured specific
federal candidates. Issue advocacy advertising
thus became the new strategy for election
spending, especially for organizations not al-
lowed to make direct contributions in federal
campaigns.
Party committees were the biggest issue ad-
vocacy spenders because they could then fi-
nance advertising that directly benefited their
candidates with soft money. Each of the major
parties spent tens of millions of dollars on ads
designed to support its presidential candidate.
Both parties also sponsored issue ads that
sought to influence the voting in marginal con-
gressional races.
The parties were not required to count any
of the funds used for issue advocacy against
federal contribution or spending limits. They
were, however, required to disclose these ex-
penditures, since all national party committee
financial activity must be reported to the FEC.
But, in most instances, the national party com-
mittees largely avoided even this requirement.
Instead of directly paying for the ads, the na-
tional committees transferred large sums to
state party committees, which purchased the
broadcast time. The national party organiza-
tions had to disclose only the amounts trans-
ferred to state committees. This tactic allowed
the parties to spend a greater share of soft
money on issue ads, since they were legally
state rather than national party expenditures.
It also shifted the responsibility for disclosing
specific expenditures to state committees, which
made it extremely difficult to trace the money.
Most estimates suggest that the party orga-
nizations spent at least $100 million on issue
advertising in 1996. The Democrats spent at
least $34 million in soft money during the presi-
dential primary season on issue ads designed
to benefit President Clinton’s reelection cam-
paign. The Republicans spent at least $20 mil-
lion, including about $9 million in soft money,
on ads designed to help Senator Dole’s presi-
dential bid in the months leading up to the
Republican national convention and another
$8 million in the general election on ads de-
signed to defend their congressional candi-
dates. In addition, the Democratic Congres-
sional Campaign Committee spent an estimated
$8.4 million on issue ads and the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee spent $10
million. Similarly, the Republican senatorial
and congressional committees spent at least
$20 million on ads aired in markets covering
key congressional races and five states.46
Party organizations were not the only groups
to engage in issue advertising in 1996. Issue ads
were broadcast in markets across the nation
and aired in every key congressional race in
the country. At least two dozen organizations
sponsored issue ads in 1996. These organiza-
tions included labor unions, a coalition of busi-
ness groups, non-profit and tax-exempt orga-
nizations, and an array of organized interest
groups. Almost all the commercials broadcast
by these organizations featured specific federal
candidates, and most were aired in the final six
weeks of the general election campaign.
The total amount spent on issue ads during
the 1996 election is not known. Because such
spending is not subject to disclosure, there is
no public record of these expenditures. What
is known is based on self-reporting by the orga-
nizations or groups involved, and many of the
advertisers chose not to reveal the extent of
their spending or the sources of their funding.
However, those sums that were reported
suggest that many tens of millions of dollars
were involved. The most prominent effort was
conducted by the AFL-CIO, which announced
its intention early in 1996 to spend $35 million
on activities designed to influence congres-
sional elections, including an estimated $22
million for issue ads. All this advertising was
directed at congressional districts held by first-
term Republicans or those with open seats.
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Other examples include the advertising done
by The Coalition, a business group led by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce ($5 million); the
Sierra Club ($4 million); and Citizens for the
Republic Education Fund, a tax-exempt foun-
dation ($4 million). Millions more are esti-
mated to have been spent by other such groups,
quite apart from the millions of dollars spent
by the Christian Coalition and National Right
to Life Committee on voter education infor-
mation and pamphlets.47
Most observers believe that even more was
spent in 1998 on issue advocacy advertising in
connection with the congressional elections
than in 1996, although no accurate estimate of
the amount spent to influence outcomes is
available due to lack of disclosure. According
to a study by the Annenberg Public Policy Cen-
ter, 836 issue ads were broadcast in 30 states
during the final 60 days before the election, of
which an estimated 70 percent were sponsored
by the major parties. The study estimated that
77 different organizations engaged in the prac-
tice during the 1998 cycle.48 While not all of
these ads were designed to influence the elec-
tion results, the widespread use of this tactic
and lack of information about its funding are a
cause for concern.
Issue Advocacy and Campaign
Finance Reform
Issue advocacy spending as practiced in the
1996 and 1998 elections highlights the tension
between the government’s authority to regu-
late campaign finance and the protection of
political speech. This issue is not easily resolved.
The freedom of political speech is a core
value of our democracy. Robust political de-
bate is the essence of a system of free and fair
elections. An informed electorate requires dis-
cussion of issues and information on policy
questions and candidates. We therefore agree
with the courts that the government’s regula-
tory authority should be narrowly limited when
it involves First Amendment rights. Govern-
ment regulation should only be permitted in
this area when a compelling interest is at stake.
But we believe that the health of our politi-
cal system is such an interest. The courts, in
their efforts to protect First Amendment liber-
ties, have adopted an approach that precludes
necessary and effective restraints on campaign
finance. The current guidelines for distinguish-
ing between express advocacy and issue advo-
cacy are so narrowly construed that it is now
possible to conduct unrestricted financial ac-
tivity that is, for all intents and purposes,
campaign spending.
Our greatest concern here is that issue ad-
vocacy spending is not even subject to full and
effective public disclosure. We believe the pub-
lic has a right to know who is attempting to
influence its vote. Currently, organized groups
and political committees other than party com-
mittees are not required to disclose their ex-
penditures or sources of funding. At best, mem-
bers of the public only know that they have
seen an advertisement sponsored by, for in-
stance, Citizens for Reform, Citizens for a Sound
Economy, Coalition for Change, or Women
for Tax Reform—all of which engaged in issue
advocacy spending in connection with the 1996
election, and none of which is a publicly regis-
tered political committee whose sources of
funding are known to the public. Such limited
information does not provide the knowledge
needed by voters to make informed decisions
or by officials to effectively carry out the ad-
ministration of campaign finance laws.
We are also troubled that issue advocacy
spending raises the demand for campaign fund-
ing and therefore for soft money. The primary
reason that national party committees sought
soft money contributions so aggressively in 1996
and 1998 is that they needed these funds to
finance their issue advertising. The emphasis
on issue advertising thus created an almost
insatiable demand for funds—whatever
amounts the party could raise could be imme-
diately spent on issue ads. This strategy in-
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creased the value of soft money and encour-
aged the parties to expand their efforts to raise
it.
Candidates also face greater pressure to raise
funds as a result of issue advocacy. Those seek-
ing office, especially those in marginal contests
or open seats, must now be prepared to wage a
campaign that competes not only with an op-
ponent but also with outside groups and party
committees. Candidates must be prepared to
respond to questions and accusations promoted
by hundreds of thousands of dollars of issue
advertising. This not only compels candidates
to spend more time and resources raising
money, but may cause them to lose effective
control of their campaigns.
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IV.
Recommendations
for Reform
Reform of the campaign finance system is
long overdue. For at least a decade, it has been
clear to most observers of American politics
that the regulatory system established by Con-
gress in the 1970s is failing to achieve its ends.
CED shares this view.
In this chapter we present our recommen-
dations for reform. These recommendations
reflect our view that no one or two changes will
achieve the diverse, and sometimes compet-
ing, objectives of a well-functioning system. We
need a comprehensive reform program that
honestly acknowledges competing values and
provides the necessary trade-offs between them.
Our proposals are therefore designed to be
taken as a whole. They present a major alterna-
tive to the current regulatory approach, one
that we believe will significantly improve our
campaign finance system.
In framing these proposals, our thinking
has been guided by several practical consider-
ations that we believe should govern any ef-
forts to legislate in this area:
(1) A program of reform should be rela-
tively simple and easy to understand. Candi-
dates and voters must be able to understand
the rules, and administrators must be able to
implement the law efficiently and effectively.
(2) The campaign finance rules should not
provide an unfair advantage to any particular
party or specific candidates. A feasible and ef-
fective regulatory system must ensure fair elec-
tions and be capable of obtaining bipartisan
support. It must also treat participants in the
process equitably. In particular, it should en-
sure that corporate entities and labor unions
are treated in a comparable manner.
(3) Reforms should not impose unrealistic
constraints on campaign funding that will place
an undue burden on those who seek to comply
with the law. Such burdens will only encourage
circumvention of the rules.
(4) Reforms must uphold the liberties pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Reforms should
not impose a burden on political speech unless
there is a compelling interest to do so, in accor-
dance with court rulings. Rather, reforms
should be designed to promote citizen partici-
pation in the political process as well as robust
political debate.
BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM
Our recommendations are also informed
by our belief in certain basic principles that
should govern a system of campaign finance
regulation. The five principles listed below re-
flect the objectives we regard as most impor-
tant, which should form the basis for evaluat-
ing regulatory reform proposals.
(1) Regulation should protect free speech and pro-
mote an informed citizenry.
The First Amendment and the principles it
embodies guarantee freedom of speech and
expression and thus protect the cornerstone of
our political system: full and robust political
debate. The courts have acknowledged the link
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between political finance and the First Amend-
ment in ruling that the financing of political
expression is a protected form of political
speech under the First Amendment. Campaign
finance laws must recognize these constitutional
considerations and uphold the principles of
free speech. It is especially important to pro-
tect and promote the political speech that takes
place in election campaigns, the purpose of
which is to provide American citizens with the
knowledge needed to make informed decisions
on Election Day.
(2) Regulation should protect the political system
from corruption or the appearance of corruption.
The regulations governing campaign fi-
nance should promote public confidence in
the political process and ensure that the integ-
rity of the electoral system is maintained. It is
therefore essential that the system guard against
corruption or the appearance of corruption in
the financing of political campaigns. A system
of political finance that fulfills this objective
helps to ensure that elected officials are re-
sponsive to broad public interests and the de-
sires of their constituencies.
(3) Regulation should ensure public accountability.
A goal of the campaign finance system
should be full transparency of the funding of
campaigns for public office, supported by the
public’s right to know. Elections allow citizens
to hold candidates and elected officials account-
able for their views and actions. If the major
participants in political campaigns are to be
held accountable, the public must have full
and timely information about their campaigns,
including information about how they are fi-
nanced. Any system of campaign finance must
therefore ensure full public disclosure of the
sources of campaign funding, the activities un-
dertaken with it, and the amounts raised and
spent. Disclosure not only provides the elector-
ate with the information it needs but also helps
curtail excesses and promote full public scru-
tiny of financial transactions.
(4) Regulation should encourage public participa-
tion in the political system.
The strength of a democracy depends upon
the political participation of its citizens. Citi-
zens should be encouraged not only to vote
but to participate in the process in other ways.
Campaign finance rules should not discourage
citizens from seeking elective office, associat-
ing with others, volunteering their skills and
time, or participating in the financing of cam-
paigns. Such participation enhances the legiti-
macy of the representative process and thereby
strengthens popular support for the political
system.
(5) Regulation should promote electoral competition.
The essence of democracy lies in competi-
tive elections that offer voters a choice of can-
didates. Competition stimulates public interest
in election campaigns, induces greater num-
bers of citizens to learn about the candidates,
gives more meaning to elections, and encour-
ages people to vote.  It is an essential element
in promoting the vitality and quality of politi-
cal life. The regulation of campaign funding
should therefore promote competitive elections
by ensuring that candidates have an opportu-
nity to obtain the resources needed to share
their views with voters.
Recommendation #1:
ELIMINATE SOFT MONEY
We believe that, as a general principle, funds
used to promote political candidacies should
be subject to the requirements and restrictions
of federal law on campaign finance. Soft money
is the most egregious example of campaign
financing that violates this principle.  No reform
is more urgently needed than the elimination of soft
money.
Some business leaders have already taken
action to help remedy this problem by refusing
to participate in the soft money system. Most
businesses in America do not give unregulated
soft money funds to the political parties. Oth-
ers, including such industry leaders as General
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Motors, AlliedSignal, and Monsanto, have re-
cently declared that they will no longer make
such contributions. They have been joined by
dozens of corporate executives, who recognize
the dangers to our system of government cre-
ated by this type of fundraising.49 CED sup-
ports these voluntary efforts to reduce soft
money and lauds the leadership shown by these
members of the business community. We urge
other business leaders, labor unions, and indi-
vidual citizens to follow this lead and voluntar-
ily work to reduce the supply of soft money
funds.
There are ample opportunities for mem-
bers of the business community to express their
support for candidates or party organizations,
either as individuals or through PACs. We en-
courage participation in the process in these
ways. But there is no need for members of the
business community, labor unions, or others to
supplement these opportunities with soft money
contributions. Participation in the soft money
practices of the national party committees fu-
els the demand for soft dollars and spurs the
arms race mentality that now characterizes party
fundraising at the national level.
Voluntary efforts alone, however, will not
solve the soft money problem. Potential do-
nors will still face pressure from elected offi-
cials and national party leaders to make soft
money contributions. We therefore believe that
a legislative remedy is needed to end soft
money. Specifically, we recommend that Con-
gress prohibit national party committees, their
officers or staff, and any organizations or enti-
ties established or controlled by national party
committees or their personnel, from soliciting,
receiving, or directing any contributions, dona-
tions, or transfers of funds that are not subject
to the limitations, prohibitions, and public dis-
closure requirements of federal law. These
committees and individuals should also be pro-
hibited from spending any funds that are not
subject to such restrictions and requirements.
Similar prohibitions should be applied to fed-
eral officeholders, candidates, and their agents
or staffs. In addition, federal officeholders or
candidates should be prohibited from raising
or spending soft money through personal PACs
or so-called “leadership PACs.” (An exemp-
tion, however, would be made for federal of-
ficeholders running for state or local office
who are raising monies allowable under the
relevant state law—e.g., a U.S. senator running
as a candidate in a gubernatorial election.)
In short, national party committees, includ-
ing the national congressional campaign com-
mittees, and federal politicians would not be
allowed to raise and spend monies from unre-
stricted sources in unlimited amounts. We be-
lieve that this reform will greatly reduce the
unregulated party money that is now flowing
through the system.
This reform also would significantly sim-
plify the rules governing party finance. Na-
tional party committees would be allowed to
raise only hard money. National party commit-
tees would no longer be able to raise or use
corporate or labor union treasury funds or
unlimited gifts from individuals and PACs.
Their revenues would have to come from lim-
ited voluntary contributions from individuals,
PACs, or other federally registered political
committees, such as candidate campaign com-
mittees. There would no longer be a need for
separate types of bank accounts or complex
allocation rules for the financing of different
types of party activity.
Taking national party committees, federal
officeholders and candidates, and their agents
and staffs out of the business of raising and
spending soft money will change the relation-
ship between donors and federal politicians. It
will reduce both the incentive for donors to
give in exchange for access and the pressure to
give that is created by solicitations from na-
tional party leaders or elected officeholders.  It
will also prevent federal candidates from rais-
ing unlimited funds that can be used by party
committees to benefit indirectly their own bids
for office. We believe that this reform will sub-
stantially alter the incentive structure that en-
Investing in the People’s Business
35
courages soft money contributions. As a result,
we expect the vast majority of this pool of funds,
especially much of the money donated by the
business community, to dry up. Most of this
money came into the system only during the
last two presidential cycles, largely in response
to the aggressive fundraising practices of the
national party committees. These donors are
unlikely to aggressively seek out other means
of pouring money into the system.
We recognize, however, that this recommen-
dation could be circumvented.  Federal office-
holders and candidates could still engage in
soft money fundraising by shifting their activi-
ties to the state level. Federal officials could
help their respective state parties raise funds
that are not subject to federal limits, and the
state parties could in turn use these monies to
finance activities, such as voter registration and
turnout drives, that influence federal elections
in their state. Such activities would diminish
the benefits of reforms adopted at the national
level.
We have carefully considered the proposal
to close this “loophole” by extending federal
regulation to any state party activities that might
influence the outcome of a federal election
and are financed by contributions not permit-
ted by federal law. But we are very troubled by
the prospect of using federal rules to govern
state party political finance, especially when
these committees are acting in conformance
with the laws adopted by the people of their
states. Such an approach raises troublesome
issues regarding the principle of federalism
and the scope of Congress’s authority to legis-
late in this area. Accordingly, we conclude that
this issue is most appropriately handled by the
states. We therefore urge state legislatures to
pass any legislation necessary to ensure that
state party committees cannot finance their
activities from unrestricted or undisclosed
sources of funding.
We recognize that a ban on soft money will
have a significant effect on the resources avail-
able to national party committees and may
diminish their role in the electoral process.
Soft money represents a substantial share of
party revenues and is used to finance many of
the costs directly related to the parties’ activi-
ties, ranging from staff salaries and overhead
expenses to voter registration and mobiliza-
tion efforts. The loss of soft money is likely to
reduce such party activities and would require
that parties pay more of their administrative
and political services costs from funds they raise
under federal limits. This, in turn, may lead to
a reduction in the amounts of money available
for candidate support or voter turnout efforts.
Since parties are the only source of private
funding (other than personal contributions or
loans) that favors challengers, a significant re-
duction in party resources is likely to decrease
the resources available to challengers. It is also
likely to reduce the amounts available for voter
identification and turnout programs. We be-
lieve that these party activities play a valuable
role in enhancing the competitiveness of elec-
tions and encouraging citizen participation.
To partially compensate for this loss, we
recommend a change in the rules limiting indi-
vidual contributions to federal candidates and
political committees. Under current law, indi-
viduals are limited to an annual total of $25,000
for all contributions made to federal candi-
dates, PACs, and party committees. We pro-
pose that Congress establish two separate ag-
gregate limits for individuals. The first would
limit the total amount contributed by an indi-
vidual to federal candidates and PACs to
$25,000 annually. The second, separate ceiling
would limit the total amount contributed by an
individual to national party committees to
$25,000 annually. This change will allow par-
ties to raise more regulated money from indi-
viduals than is permissible under current fed-
eral law.
Recommendation #2:
IMPROVE CANDIDATE ACCESS
TO RESOURCES
Reform should ease the burdens of fund-
raising by making it easier for candidates to
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raise the funds needed to communicate effec-
tively with voters and mount competitive cam-
paigns.
Fundraising has become more onerous in
part because contribution limits have remained
fixed. In the 20 years since FECA was adopted,
inflation has reduced the value of a $1,000
contribution to approximately $350, and the
costs of campaigns have risen much faster than
inflation. Consequently, in each successive elec-
tion, candidates have had to raise a signifi-
cantly larger number of contributions.
We recommend that Congress raise the limit
on individual contributions to federal candi-
dates from $1,000 per election to $3,000 and
index this new limit for inflation.
This change in the individual contribution
limits will approximately restore the purchas-
ing power of contributions that has been lost
since FECA was adopted. It will encourage can-
didates to rely more on individuals for cam-
paign funds and allow them to receive more
money from their most generous supporters.
By significantly increasing the potential pool
of money available from individuals, it will there-
fore enhance the role of the individual donor
in the financing of federal campaigns.
We recognize, however, that a relatively
small number of donors are willing or able to
give $3,000 to a federal candidate. In order to
ensure that such donors do not gain undue
influence as a result of this change, an
individual’s total contributions to federal can-
didates and PACs should remain subject to the
annual limit of $25,000 described above.*
We do not believe that this increase in indi-
vidual contribution limits materially increases
the risk of corruption or the appearance of
corruption in the political process. The amount
contributed by any one individual under these
higher limits will still represent an insignificant
share of most candidates’ total receipts. Finally,
all such donations will continue to be publicly
disclosed, which makes this funding easy to
trace.
By expanding the amounts individuals may
give, our proposal should reduce the incentive
for candidates to seek PAC funding. This in-
crease in the individual contribution limit to
$3,000 will significantly reduce the disparity
between it and the maximum allowable PAC
contribution of $5,000. This reform will there-
fore reduce the relative influence of PACs by
increasing the role of individuals. It will make
it easier for candidates to eschew PAC contri-
butions, since it will be easier to replace PAC
monies with funds raised from individual do-
nors.
We are concerned, however, that this in-
crease in individual limits alone will have only
a modest effect on public participation in fed-
eral campaign funding, since relatively few in-
dividual donors are constrained by the current
ceilings. Therefore, to broaden public partici-
pation and enhance the role of the small do-
nor in the financing of campaigns, we favor a
program of public matching funds for congres-
sional candidates similar to the program that
now exists for presidential candidates.
CED recommends that Congress establish a
voluntary program of public funding under
which individual contributions to congressional
candidates would be eligible for matching sub-
sidies. Candidates who choose to participate
would receive two dollars in public money for
every dollar received from an individual do-
nor, up to a maximum of $400 for each indi-
vidual contribution of $200. Candidates would
qualify by raising a threshold amount of money
in small individual donations of $200 or less.
Those who choose to participate in the pro-
gram would be required to abide by campaign
spending limits, as described below. Each par-
ticipating candidate must also limit any per-
sonal contribution to his or her own campaign
to $25,000. The costs of the program would be
financed through federal budget appropria-
tions.
We estimate that the initial cost of this pro-
gram of public subsidies will be in the range of
$400 million to $600 million for each two-year
election cycle. The two-for-one match is higher
than the current dollar-for-dollar match used
in presidential primary campaigns. Soliciting
Investing in the People’s Business
*See memorandum by WILLIAM F. HECHT (page 44).
37
small contributions will be far more cost-
effective under a two-for-one match program.
Under this proposal, total individual contribu-
tions plus the matching funds would be sufficient to
fully finance congressional campaign spending at
current levels. We make no apology for proposing
direct public financing of this program. The improve-
ment of our campaign finance system is a public
benefit, and it should therefore be publicly funded. It
is an investment in the people’s business.
In deciding to recommend this program,
we considered other forms of subsidy such as
providing free television or radio broadcast
time to candidates or reduced-rate postage.
But we found these alternatives to be less at-
tractive. Free or reduced-rate broadcast time
for candidates and reduced-rate postage are
unfunded mandates that would shift the bur-
den of payment onto broadcasters or the U.S.
Postal Service. But more important, we believe
the benefits of a program of public matching
funds far outweigh the advantages of these
more limited alternatives:
First, the leveraging effect of matching sub-
sidies would encourage individual contributions
by small donors and broaden participation in
our political system.
Second, public subsidies would provide can-
didates with a strong financial incentive to seek
out such small contributions from a large num-
ber of donors. In advancing this view, we draw
from the experience of the matching fund pro-
gram in presidential nomination campaigns.
The availability of matching funds has induced
presidential candidates to raise a substantial
portion of their campaign funds through small
contributions. As a result, more than a third of
the revenues received by most presidential can-
didates comes from public funding. Those can-
didates who prove particularly successful at gen-
erating small gifts often receive 40 percent or
more of their funding from this source.
Third, as is also evident from the experience
in presidential campaigns, the availability of
matching funds, when combined with expen-
diture limits, reduces the burdens of
fundraising. Every dollar received in public
funding is one less dollar a candidate has to
solicit.
Fourth, public funding diminishes the risk
of corruption. Because these funds are not
from private sources, they are attached to no
particular interest. Because they also encour-
age candidates to broaden their base of finan-
cial support, they help to diminish the influ-
ence of large donors. In particular, public
funding reduces the relative influence of PACs
and may provide candidates with a further in-
centive to raise contributions from individuals
rather than PACs.
Finally, and most important, public fund-
ing, along with higher individual contribution
limits, will promote competition in federal elec-
tions. As we noted in Chapter II, the chief
financial impediment to greater competition
in federal elections is the lack of money on the
part of challengers. Our proposals will improve
the resources available to these candidates, most
of whom currently do not raise sufficient funds
to wage a viable campaign. By making it easier
for challengers to raise funds, these reforms
will also make it less likely that candidates will
be discouraged from running by the burdens
of fundraising. This, too, should improve the
level of competition, while expanding the
choices available to voters.
Recommendation #3:
REDUCE THE FUNDRAISING “ARMS
RACE” WITH CONGRESSIONAL
CAMPAIGN SPENDING LIMITS
Allowing congressional candidates to raise
money more easily will not necessarily reduce
the emphasis on fundraising in federal cam-
paigns. Candidates might respond to these re-
forms by simply escalating the open-ended
quest for campaign dollars, relying on the
higher contribution limits and availability of
public funding to raise and spend even larger
sums than they do under the current system.
After all, it is difficult to legislate political be-
havior, and competitive pressures feed an “arms
race” fundraising mentality. Faced with no clear
limit to the amounts that their opponents can
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spend, candidates may continue to believe it
necessary to raise as much money as possible.
The absence of spending limits would there-
fore undermine the benefits from providing
candidates with easier access to funds.
We therefore recommend that Congress es-
tablish a system of voluntary candidate spend-
ing ceilings. Candidates who agree to accept
public subsidies would be required to abide by
these ceilings.
One advantage of public financing is that it
facilitates ceilings on expenditures. The Su-
preme Court has upheld the constitutionality
of spending ceilings for candidates who volun-
tarily accept public subsidies.
In calling for limits on expenditures, we
recognize that ceilings must be generous
enough to induce candidate participation, but
not so generous that they have little practical
effect on campaign expenditures. In our view,
these parameters are best fulfilled by limits set
at the following levels. In House elections, a
candidate receiving public funds should be al-
lowed to spend up to $500,000 in a primary
and $500,000 in a general election. An addi-
tional $200,000 would be allowed in the event
of a runoff election. These limits would be
adjusted for inflation at the beginning of each
new election cycle. In Senate elections, a candi-
date should be allowed to spend a total amount
equal to a base of $1 million plus 50 cents
times the voting-age population of the state.
An additional amount equal to 20 percent of
this limit would be allowed in the event of a
runoff election. This ceiling would also be ad-
justed for inflation. Any costs incurred by a
campaign for legal and accounting services, or
other costs incurred to comply with the law,
would be exempt from these limits.
These ceilings are set at a higher level than
those included in most current legislative pro-
posals. We feel that more generous limits will
encourage candidate participation in the pub-
lic funding program and help to ensure com-
pliance. Such ceilings will permit candidates to
communicate effectively with voters, while elimi-
nating the open-ended quest for funding that
now characterizes federal campaigns. In the
near term, limits set at these levels would not
substantially reduce the amounts spent in the
majority of congressional campaigns, but they
would constrain spending in the most expen-
sive House and Senate contests. For example,
in 1998, 101 House candidates spent more than
our proposed limit; many of them would have
had to restrict their spending under our pro-
posal. Over time, however, ceilings at these
levels should substantially reduce spending in
federal elections relative to its rapidly increas-
ing trend.
Ceilings should not put candidates at a sig-
nificant disadvantage vis-a-vis their competitors.
Candidates who agree to accept subsidies and
adhere to the limits may be challenged by op-
ponents who do not agree to these restrictions.
Ceilings on candidate expenditures may also
encourage PACs and other organizations to
engage in independent expenditure or issue
advertising campaigns, which cannot be lim-
ited, to support or defeat candidates. To en-
sure that candidates who agree to ceilings are
not unfairly disadvantaged, the ceilings should
be adjusted in these circumstances. Candidates
who face opponents who are not bound by
spending limits, or who are opposed by inde-
pendent expenditures, should be allowed to
spend additional amounts and receive addi-
tional public subsidies equal to the amounts
expended against them.
We realize that limits on spending do not
guarantee that candidates will have the re-
sources to compete against a better-funded
opponent or well-financed independent spend-
ers. Party committees therefore should be al-
lowed to assist candidates by providing finan-
cial assistance up to the level of the spending
limit. Party organizations should be allowed to
make coordinated expenditures on behalf of a
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candidate to supplement a candidate’s cam-
paign spending, so long as the combined
amount spent by the candidate and the party in
a race does not exceed the set limit.†
Finally, spending limits will be effective only
if they are adequately monitored and enforced.
We are concerned that the FEC is currently
underfunded and understaffed. At its present
levels of staff and budget authority, the FEC
will not be able to efficiently and effectively
monitor compliance with spending ceilings,
conduct the audits that will be required in a
program of congressional campaign finance,
or determine violations in a timely and respon-
sible manner. We therefore urge Congress to
review the staffing, structure, and current fund-
ing of the FEC and provide it with the re-
sources and authority needed to ensure accu-
rate and timely monitoring and compliance with
the law. The FEC should be able to expand its
audit and compliance staff to the extent needed
to ensure vigilant monitoring of candidate com-
pliance and timely and efficient audits of the
financial activities of candidates receiving pub-
lic funding and subject to spending limits.
Recommendation #4:
REFORM ISSUE ADVOCACY
As noted in Chapter III, any effort to reform
issue advocacy spending in connection with
federal elections must strike a regulatory bal-
ance between protecting political speech and
protecting the integrity of our electoral pro-
cess. The extent of the regulation to be allowed
will ultimately be decided by the courts.
We cannot determine in advance how the
courts will eventually decide this issue. We do
believe, however, that the current standard used
in the majority of decisions rendered to date,
the so-called “magic words” test, is too narrow.
Under this standard, campaign finance laws
are easily circumvented; the mere avoidance of
specific words in the text of a communication
allows the sponsoring organization to operate
wholly outside the scope of FECA. Their elec-
tion-directed messages are not subject to fed-
eral contribution limits or public disclosure.
More restraint is needed, and we prefer a
broader standard for defining “express advo-
cacy.”
We urge Congress to adopt a standard that
sets forth clear criteria for identifying public
communications that constitute express advo-
cacy, to require that such communications be
wholly financed from funds raised under fed-
eral contribution limits, and to require that the
sources of funding and amounts spent on such
communications be publicly disclosed. We sug-
gest that express advocacy include communi-
cations that: (1) refer to a clearly identified
federal candidate, or feature the image or like-
ness of a clearly identified federal candidate;
(2) occur within 30 days of a primary election
and are targeted at the state in which the pri-
mary is occurring, or within 60 days of a gen-
eral election; and (3) would be understood by a
reasonable person to be encouraging others to
support or oppose that candidate. Communi-
cations that meet these criteria would have to
be paid for with funds raised under federal
contribution limits. In addition, the sources of
funding and the amounts expended would be
fully disclosed and reported to the FEC.
In our view, this proposal would strengthen
the integrity of our electoral system without
overly restricting political speech. It would safe-
guard the system against corruption by ensur-
ing that unlimited corporate treasury funds,
labor union treasury funds, or other monies
not permitted in federal elections, as well as
undisclosed transactions between unregistered
political committees, are not used to influence
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federal elections. It would ensure citizens’ rights
to know the identity of the speakers who are
attempting to influence their votes. And it
would make publicly available the information
needed for adequate enforcement. Those who
wish to sponsor such messages could still com-
municate their views to the electorate, but they
would have to pay for these communications
with funds raised from voluntary contributions
subject to legal limits.
We recognize that this proposal may not
withstand judicial scrutiny. In that instance, we
would support the most comprehensive regime
of disclosure permitted by the courts. We
strongly support a regulatory approach that at
least ensures disclosure of the amounts spent
and the sources of funding for candidate-
specific issue ads that occur within a reason-
able time period before an election. If neces-
sary, subject to the determination of the courts,
this proposal could be further narrowed by
limiting the disclosure of sources of funding to
the top donors to an issue advocacy group, or
by restricting disclosure to candidate-specific
There is no panacea for the many problems
of our campaign finance system. To some de-
gree these problems are an inevitable part of
the price we pay for democratic elections. But
a program of effective reform can nevertheless
improve the vitality of our politics by reducing
the emphasis on campaign fundraising and
increasing competition in federal contests. It
can stem the flow of unregulated money and
shift political influence more from organized
interests towards a broad base of individual
voters. These changes will improve the quality
of representation provided by elected officials.
They will promote public confidence in elec-
tions and encourage more citizens to partici-
pate actively in them. Reform can thus en-
hance the role of individual citizens in our
ads broadcast on television or radio within a
reasonable time period before an election.
Disclosure has the advantage of being con-
stitutionally permissible. Courts have ruled that
disclosure is an essential tool in guarding against
political corruption or the appearance of cor-
ruption and have upheld disclosure rules for
lobbying expenditures as well as campaign fi-
nances. While the courts have protected anony-
mous speech, this exemption to full disclosure
has usually applied to specific circumstances.
The extent to which the courts might allow
required disclosure of issue ads, or even candi-
date-specific messages, is yet to be determined.
But given the severe problems created by the
current lack of disclosure in issue advocacy, we
believe that requirements for effective disclo-
sure and transparency are urgently needed.
Then the public will be better able at least to
assess the messages distributed through these
communications, and regulators and
policymakers will have a better sense of the
scope of this activity and its impact on the
effectiveness of federal election laws and regu-
lations.
CONCLUSION
nation’s political life. This is the best way to
ensure the integrity of our government.
Reform will not come easily. Major changes
in the current system are needed, and such
dramatic changes are always difficult to make.
This is especially true for a program of reform
that candidly balances deeply felt competing
values and recognizes and accepts trade-offs
between diverse goals. However, we do not
believe that the current trends in campaign
finance are sustainable. They will eventually be
rejected by the public. Reform will come. We
believe that these recommendations, when
taken as a whole, provide the foundation for
an effective, broad-based, and competitive sys-
tem of campaign finance.
Investing in the People’s Business
41
Endnotes
1. Celinda Lake, “Polls Say Public Has Prescription for
Reform,” Roll Call, March 23, 1998.
2. Money and Politics: A National Survey of the Public’s Views
on How Money Impacts Our Political System (Washington,
D.C.: Center for Responsive Politics, April-May 1997),
p. 1. This survey was conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates. Hereafter cited as PSRA.
3. Buckley Stops Here, Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund Working Group on Campaign Finance Litigation
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1998), p. 16.
4. PSRA, p. 2.
5. Ann Scales, “Blacks, Especially in South, Answered the
Democrats’ Call,” The Boston Globe, November 5, 1998,
page A-34.
6. Buckley Stops Here, p. 17.
7. Nancy Benac, “American Trust in Government Im-
proving, But Still Overall Low,” Associated Press News
Release, March 9, 1998 (Reporting the findings of a sur-
vey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People
& the Press).
8. To the greatest extent possible, data in this report
reflect the 1998 campaigns and elections and are those
reported by the Federal Elections Commission as of
February 15, 1999. For most, but not all, campaigns the
data reflect campaign reports covering the period through
December 31, 1998. These data are preliminary, and in
some cases incomplete, and will change as later reports
are filed.
9. Herbert E. Alexander, “Financing the 1996 Election,”
Regina Dougherty, et al., eds., America at the Polls 1996
(Storrs, Conn.: Roper Center for Public Opinion Re-
search, 1997), p. 142.
10. There are no satisfactory price indices for the com-
posite of goods and services used in campaigns.
11. Herbert E. Alexander and Anthony Corrado, Financ-
ing the 1992 Election (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe,
1995), p. 21. See also Major Garrett, “Money, Politics and
the First Amendment,” Cato Institute Briefing Papers (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Cato Institute, June 19, 1997), p. 2.
12. Data reported in Joseph E. Cantor, Denis Steven
Rutkus, and Kevin B. Greely, Free and Reduced-Rate Televi-
sion Time for Political Candidates (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Research Service, July 7, 1997), p. 5.
13. This total did not include party-sponsored “issue ads,”
which included ads specifically designed to support
Clinton and Dole.
14. Ira Chinoy, “In Presidential Race, TV Ads Were Big-
gest ’96 Cost by Far,” Washington Post, March 31, 1997,
p. A19.
15. Sarah Fritz and Dwight Morris, Handbook of Campaign
Spending: Money in the 1990 Congressional Races (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1992), pp. 53-54;
Dwight Morris and Murielle E. Gamache, Handbook of
Campaign Spending: Money in the 1992 Congressional Races
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994),
pp. 6-10; and Dwight Morris and Murielle E. Gamache,
Gold-Plated Politics: The 1992 Congressional Races (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), p. 9.
16. See Sara Fritz and Dwight Morris, Gold-Plated Politics:
Running for Congress in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly, 1992), pp. 14-26; for 1992, Morris
and Gamache, Gold-Plated Politics: The 1992 Congressional
Races, pp. 18-29.
17. Foreign citizens who are not lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States.
18. Anthony Corrado, “The Changing Environment of
Presidential Campaign Finance,” in William G. Mayer,
ed., In Pursuit of the White House (Chatham, NJ: Chatham
House, 1995), p. 226.
19. See, for example, the statements of former legislators
in Martin Schram, Speaking Freely (Washington, D.C.: Cen-
ter for Responsive Politics, 1995), Chapter 3.
20. Phillip M. Stern, Still the Best Congress Money Can Buy
(Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1992), p. 119.
21. 1998 data on the size of contributions are from the
Federal Election Commission “cansum98.zip” at <http://
www.fec.gov/finance/ftpsum.htm.
22. Based on data reported to the Federal Election Com-
mission as of November 23, 1998.
23. Federal Election Commission, “PAC Activity Increases
in 1995-96 Election Cycle,” press release, April 22, 1997.
24. Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 104-109.
25. For a summary of this literature and the major find-
ings, see John R. Wright, Interest Groups & Congress: Lobby-
ing, Contributions, and Influence (Boston: Allyn and Bacon,
1996), pp. 136-149.
26. Jonathan S. Krasno and Donald Philip Green, “Stop-
ping the Buck Here: The Case for Campaign Spending
Limits,” The Brookings Review, Spring 1993, pp. 17-21.
27. Center for Responsive Politics, “Money and Incum-
bency Win Big on Election Day,” press release, November
4, 1998.
42
28. In this model, challenger spending and party identifi-
cation explain about 55 percent of the variation in voting
results. The graph has been simplified to remove the
effect of party identification. Interestingly, inclusion of
the incumbent’s spending does not add significantly to
the explanatory power of the model, apparently because
of the interdependence between challenger and incum-
bent spending in an “arms race” effect.
29. The extraordinary spike to $54 million (20 percent)
in 1994 resulted principally from Republican Michael
Huffington’s self-financing of more than $28 million in
the California race and the unusual (for an incumbent)
self-financing of nearly $7 million in Wisconsin by Sena-
tor Herbert Kohl.
30. Alexander, “Financing the 1996 Election,” pp. 143-
144, and Makinson, The Big Picture, p. 4.
31. 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
32. The data in this paragraph and in the analysis that
follows are based on CED computations from data re-
ported to the Federal Election Commission. See Federal
Election Commission, “FEC Reports Major Increase in
Party Activity for 1995-96,” press release, March 19, 1997.
33. Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections (Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995), p. 86.
34. The following review of the origins of soft money is
loosely based on the more detailed legal history found in
Anthony Corrado, “Party Soft Money,” in Anthony
Corrado, et al., Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997),
Chapter 6.
35. Anthony Corrado, “Hard Facts About Soft Money,”
Trends in Political Financing and Campaign Reform, Occa-
sional Paper 5 (Los Angeles: Citizens’ Research Founda-
tion, 1997), p. 3.
36. Federal Election Commission, “Political Party Fund-
raising Continues to Climb,” press release, January 26,
1999.
37. Anthony Corrado, “Soft Money: To Reform or Not to
Reform,” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
New England Political Science Association, Salem, Mass.,
April 22, 1994.
38. Federal Election Commission, “Soft Money: Draft
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Memorandum to the
Federal Election Commission from Lawrence M. Noble,
Agenda Document 98-10, January 26, 1998, p. 22.
39. Based on data developed by Public Disclosure, Inc.,
for the Campaign Reform Project. These findings are
reported at http://206.239.183.87/SoftMoneyReport.htm
(January 29, 1999).
40. Ralph Vartabedian, “Corporate Traffic Heavy on U.S.
Political Money Trail,” Los Angeles Times, September 21,
1997, p. A1.
41. The examples that follow are based on the soft money
contribution data found in Jennifer Keen and John Daly,
Beyond the Limits: Soft Money in the 1996 Elections (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Center for Responsive Politics, 1997).
42. 424 U.S. at 42.
43. For a review of the decisions made in this area, see
Trevor Potter, “Issue Advocacy and Express Advocacy,” in
Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook, pp. 227-239.
44. Furgatch v. FEC, 807 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987), at 864.
45. Maine Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. FEC, 914
F.Supp. 8 (D. Me. 1996), aff’d, 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996).
46. Based on data reported in Anthony Corrado, “Financ-
ing the 1996 Elections,” in Gerald M. Pomper, ed., The
Election of 1996 (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997),
and Diana Dwyre, “Pushing the Campaign Finance Enve-
lope,” Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.,
August 28-31, 1997.
47. See Annenberg Public Policy Center, Issue Advocacy
Advertising During the 1996 Campaign: A Catalog (Philadel-
phia, Penn.: Annenberg Public Policy Center, September
1997), and Eliza Newlin Carney, “Stealth Bombers,”
National Journal, August 16, 1997, p. 1640.
48. The Annenberg Public Policy Center study is avail-
able at http://appcpenn.org/issueads/.
49. See, among others, Mary Beth Regan and Amy Borrus,
“Business Gets Hard-Nosed About Soft Money,” Business
Week, June 23, 1997; David Lightman, “Corporate Execu-
tives Jump on Finance Reform Bandwagon,” Hartford
Courant, July 8, 1998; and Jerome Kohlberg, “‘Soft Money’
is Bad Business,” New York Times, July 5, 1998.
43
Page 3, HARRY L. FREEMAN, with which
THOMAS J. KLUTZNICK has asked to be
associated
No responsible person can in any way ob-
ject to or quarrel with the report and its recom-
mendations; we all know that campaign contri-
butions—and the cost of campaigns—are
incredibly out of line.
Having said that, and with due respect to
the drafters, I do not believe this Congress, or
even the next one, will enact campaign reform
legislation. I have looked at the vote and head
counts and just do not see it. We would have to
have a major turn of events, and this I admit is
possible, to turn the political tide.
We can encourage, and already have en-
couraged, U.S. companies to voluntarily stop
the flow, absolutely, of “soft money.” We tried
this around 10 years ago when the average
corporate soft money contribution was $10,000
or $25,000. Now it has skyrocketed beyond
prior belief. CED’s efforts should be concen-
trated on negotiations and on urging other
major business organizations to try to convince
all their members to “take the pledge.”  In-
deed, I think most companies would welcome
a way out of this situation. There is no need to
drop support for revision of the laws. But I
urge CED to take this opportunity to take a
path where some degree of success might be
obtained and with relatively little time and
expense.
The nonconforming companies can make
their soft money contributions, but they would
be identified through the FEC. I believe the
media would pick up those who stray from the
practice.
If corporations follow this path, it will be
much easier to try to contain organized labor’s
contributions, and hopefully the cost of cam-
paigns.
Page 3, NED REGAN
I am pleased to be associated with this re-
port and I support its recommendations. I have,
however, one major qualification.
While our present form of raising money is
clearly flawed, its impact on the electoral pro-
cess and government policy setting is not as
pernicious as often portrayed. Consider the
following points.
• Paid ads are now a vital source of informa-
tion on candidates. As every survey shows,
and readers and viewers know, serious news
media coverage of candidates for public of-
fice has decreased. Even in the last presi-
dential election the candidates were rarely
given much more than “photo-op” cover-
age on the six o’clock news. Increasingly
candidates have to resort to paid ads to
explain their position (or criticize their op-
ponents’).
• Fundraising activities do not detract from
meeting voters to discuss issues; in fact, it is
somewhat the opposite. Fundraising is not
all done through frantic phone calls to lob-
byists; money is raised through an endless
round of breakfasts, lunches and after-work
meetings (albeit with individuals with the
ability to write at least a modest check) where
the issues are always fiercely discussed. Com-
munity gatherings, at one time a staple of
urban living, have diminished in suburban
settings, so fund raising events have become
a major way for candidates to interact with
voters.
• Incumbents raise a disproportionate share
of campaign funds, but this is not a new
phenomenon. Incumbents are powerful and
have always raised the most money and gar-
nered the most support from interest
groups.
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• There are numerous impediments associ-
ated with seeking public office, and raising
large amounts of money is certainly one.
But the major reason potential candidates
do not come forward is because of the in-
tense media scrutiny their personal lives
would receive.
Finally, we appear to be getting fairly good
government these days. It is centerist and prag-
matic at the federal level, with fiscal and social
problems that have bedeviled the country for
decades now resolved. And state governors and
city mayors are widely praised for their pro-
gressive and fiscally sound policies. In spite of
the malevolence attributed to our campaign
finance process, government seems to work
quite well.
Pages 4 and 36, WILLIAM F. HECHT
 In addition to adjusting the limit on indi-
vidual contributions for inflation, it is appro-
priate to inflation-adjust the limits of PAC con-
tributions. This would restore the purchasing
power of contributions, which has been lost
since Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)
was adopted 25 years ago. As noted on p. 15,
PACs “collectively represent thousands of dif-
ferent interests and tens of thousands of indi-
vidual contributors. All PAC monies contrib-
uted to candidates must come from voluntary
donations; a committee can request, but not
require, such donations from the members of
a corporation or group with which it is associ-
ated. PACs thus provide small donors with a
means of participating in the financing of cam-
paigns through a broader group that repre-
sents their concerns. In this way, they have
increased public participation in the financing
of elections and offered individuals a valuable
means of exercising their rights of free speech
and political association.”
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For more than 50 years, the Committee for
Economic Development has been a respected
influence on the formation of business and
public policy. CED is devoted to these two
objectives:
To develop, through objective research and
informed discussion, findings and recommenda-
tions for private and public policy that will contribute
to preserving and strengthening our free society, achiev-
ing steady economic growth at high employment and
reasonably stable prices, increasing productivity and
living standards, providing greater and more equal
opportunity for every citizen, and improving the qual-
ity of life for all.
To bring about increasing understanding by
present and future leaders in business, government,
and education, and among concerned citizens, of the
importance of these objectives and the ways in which
they can be achieved.
CED’s work is supported by private volun-
tary contributions from business and industry,
foundations, and individuals. It is independent,
nonprofit, nonpartisan, and nonpolitical.
Through this business-academic partner-
ship, CED endeavors to develop policy state-
ments and other research materials that
commend themselves as guides to public and
business policy; that can be used as texts in
college economics and political science courses
and in management training courses; that
will be considered and discussed by newspaper
and magazine editors, columnists, and com-
mentators; and that are distributed abroad to
promote better understanding of the Ameri-
can economic system.
CED believes that by enabling business
leaders to demonstrate constructively their con-
cern for the general welfare, it is helping busi-
ness to earn and maintain the national and
community respect essential to the successful
functioning of the free enterprise capitalist
system.
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Children in Need: Investment Strategies for the Educationally Disadvantaged (1987)
Finance and Third World Economic Growth (1987)
Reforming Health Care: A Market Prescription (1987)
Work and Change: Labor Market Adjustment Policies in a Competitive World (1987)
Leadership for Dynamic State Economies (1986)
Investing in Our Children: Business and the Public Schools (1985)
Fighting Federal Deficits: The Time for Hard Choices (1985)
Strategy for U.S. Industrial Competitiveness (1984)
Productivity Policy: Key to the Nation's Economic Future (1983)
Energy Prices and Public Policy (1982)
Public-Private Partnership: An Opportunity for Urban Communities (1982)
Reforming Retirement Policies (1981)
Transnational Corporations and Developing Countries: New Policies for a Changing
World Economy (1981)
Stimulating Technological Progress (1980)
Redefining Government's Role in the Market System (1979)
Jobs for the Hard-to-Employ: New Directions for a Public-Private Partnership (1978)
*Statements issued in association with CED counterpart organizations in foreign countries.
CE Circulo de Empresarios
Madrid, Spain
CEDA Committee for Economic Development of Australia
Sydney, Australia
EVA Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies
Helsinki, Finland
FAE Forum de Administradores de Empresas
Lisbon, Portugal
FDE Belgian Enterprise Foundation
Brussels, Belgium
IDEP Institut de l’Entreprise
Paris, France
IW Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft
Cologne,  Germany
Keizai Doyukai
Tokyo, Japan
SMO Stichting Maatschappij en Onderneming
The Netherlands
SNS Studieförbundet Naringsliv och Samhälle
Stockholm, Sweden
CED COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS
Close relations exist between the Committee for Economic Development and
independent, nonpolitical research organizations in other countries. Such counter-
part groups are composed of business executives and scholars and have objectives
similar to those of CED, which they pursue by similarly objective methods. CED
cooperates with these organizations on research and study projects of common
interest to the various countries concerned. This program has resulted in a
number of joint policy statements involving such international matters as energy,
East-West trade, assistance to developing countries, and the reduction of nontariff
barriers to trade.
